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Thaler: The National Collegiate Athletic Association, Random Drug-Testing

NOTE

THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, RANDOM DRUG-TESTING,
AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH EXCEPTION
It is not unreasonableto set traps to keep foxes from entering hen
houses even in the absence of evidence of prior vulpine intrusionor
individualized suspicion that a particularfox has an appetite for
chickens.1
Honorable Alvin B. Rubin
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the Eightieth National Collegiate Athletic
(NCAA)2 convention, the NCAA instituted a detailed
program 3 authorizing the NCAA Executive Committee
student-athletes who compete in NCAA championships

Association
drug-testing
to drug test
and certified

I. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir.
1987), affid, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989).
2. The NCAA is "a voluntary, unincorporated association of nearly one thousand fouryear colleges and universities." Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1020 (4th Cir. 1984).
The NCAA promulgates and implements rules and regulations concerning "minimum standards for scholarship, sportsmanship, and amateurism." ld; see also NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS'N CONST. art. 2 (setting forth the purposes and fundamental policy of the
NCAA) [hereinafter NCAA CONST.]; infra text accompanying notes 163-66, 176-86 (discussing the NCAA's regulatory concern with higher education, fairness in competition, and the
health of the student athlete).
3. See infra note 164 (citing the preface to the 1987-88 NCAA Drug Testing Program);
NCAA Prepares to Test Athletes for Drug Use, JET, Oct. 13, 1986, at 51; Selcraig, The
NCAA Goes After Drugs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 6, 1986, at 75.
4. See NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 5, § 2 (defining the NCAA Executive Committee). A general responsibility of the Executive Committee is to "[t]ransact the business and
administer the affairs of the Association in accordance with the policies of the Association and
the Council." Id. at art. 5, § 2(c)(1).
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postseason football contests.5 The NCAA's decision to authorize the

random selection of student-athletes raises important fourth amendment concerns which do not exist with a selection system based upon
reasonable suspicion.' Contrary to many drug-testing programs instituted throughout the United States, the NCAA does not limit itself

to testing individuals based upon reasonable suspicion.7 The NCAA
selects student-athletes for drug-testing based upon a system of random selection, position of finish, or suspicion.'
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether the NCAA
drug-testing program is a reasonable search and seizure under the
fourth amendment. 9 In order to facilitate a comparative analysis
with those cases which have held random drug-testing to be constitu-

tionally reasonable, 10 Section II provides an overview of the NCAA

5. Executive Regulation art. 1, § 7(a), states in relevant part:
The Executive Committee shall authorize methods for drug testing of student-athletes who compete in NCAA championships and certified postseason football contests .... The Executive Committee shall determine those championships and certified postseason football contests for which drug tests shall be made and the
procedures to be followed in disclosing its determinations.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N CONST., EXECUTIVE REGULATION, art. 1, § 7(a), at
206 [hereinafter NCAA EXEC. REG.].
6. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional requirement that a search be based on individualized suspicion).
7. See infra note 104-05 (listing cases requiring individualized suspicion and defining
"reasonable suspicion").

8. NCAA,

THE

1988-89 NCAA

DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM

13 (1988) [hereinafter

NCAA PAMPHLET] (reprinting §§ 4.2, 4.3 "Student-Athlete Selection").
9. The fourth amendment guarantees that:
Itihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10. In the context of drug-testing in the workplace, the factual settings differ greatly
among those cases upholding random drug-testing programs. Despite these factual differences,
each program contains similar procedural guidelines and safeguards which have led courts to
uphold the random drug-testing program as constitutionally reasonable. See, e.g., National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1987) (Customs
Service employees), afl'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143
(3d Cir.) (jockeys), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 448-49 (D.D.C. 1987) (Department of Transportation employees);
Mullholland v. Department of Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1569-70 (E.D. Va. 1987) (civilian
U.S. Army employees); see also infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text (discussing the
necessity for procedural safeguards and standards for athletes). But see Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575. 590 (9th Cir. 1988) (railway employees), rev'd sub nom.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521-22 (D.N.J. 1986) (fire fighters).
Significantly, a number of cases have found the random drug-testing of athletes to be
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drug-testing program." As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to
determine whether the fourth amendment's constraints apply to the
NCAA as a state actor, and if so, whether the submission of urine
for the detection of drugs is a "search" for fourth amendment purposes. Thus, Section III of this Note discusses the applicability of
the fourth amendment to the NCAA, 12 and Section IV discusses

whether drug-testing should be characterized as a search for fourth
amendment purposes. 3
Drug-testing programs not requiring individualized suspicion
have generally been held unconstitutional.14 Where the administrative search exception applies, however, individualized suspicion is not
required and the search need only be reasonable.' 5 In Section V the
administrative search exception and an overall standard of reasona-

bleness are applied to the NCAA drug-testing program. 16 Consequently, this Note concludes that the NCAA drug-testing program is
reasonable under the fourth amendment. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679
F. Supp. 833, 857-58 (N.D. Ind.) (high school atheletes), afl'd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1988); O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002-05 (W.D. Wash.) (discussing the likelihood of success on the merits of a challenge to the NCAA drug-testing program),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
II. See infra notes 18-42 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (describing the NCAA drug-testing program).
12. See infra notes 43-78 (discussing state action theory and its applicability to the
NCAA).
13. See infra notes 79-97 (discussing whether the submission of urine is a search for
fourth amendment purposes).
14. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding program unreasonable where railway employees were tested without individualized
suspicion), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring reasonable
suspicion in order for city to drug test fire fighters); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829
(D. Md. 1988) (finding the United States Army's random drug-testing program unconstitutional, since no reasonable suspicion was required before a person could be tested); Taylor v.
O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. II1. 1987) (testing of correctional officers unconstitutional
without reasonable suspicion); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit
Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (testing of municipal bus drivers unconstitutional
without reasonable suspicion); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio
1987) (finding program unconstitutional where testing of police academy cadets was not based
on reasonable suspicion); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (testing of fire fighters unreasonable without particularized suspicion); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion
in order for drug-testing program to be constitutional); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986) (requiring reasonable
suspicion to test public school teachers), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d
456 (1987).
15. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 161-257 and accompanying text.
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a reasonable search under the fourth amendment
despite the lack of
17
a warrant or individualized suspicion.
II. THE NCAA

DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM

Each year, prior to participation in NCAA intercollegiate competition, each student-athlete signs a consent form acknowledging an
understanding of the NCAA drug-testing program.18 In addition, the
student-athlete consents to be tested according to the rules and regulations promulgated by the NCAA. 19 Refusal to sign the consent
form automatically results in ineligibility for participation in all intercollegiate competition. 0
The drug-testing program permits NCAA officials to collect

urine on specific occasions.21 The urine specimens are then sent to
NCAA-certified laboratories22 for detection of specific substances
banned by the NCAA Executive Committee. 23 The NCAA tests
only those athletes who compete in NCAA championships and certi17. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (reprinting and discussing the NCAA
consent form). The student-athlete is given an opportunity to ask questions regarding NCAA
rules and regulations and affirms that he was given this opportunity when signing the consent
form. See infra note 193.
19. See NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 3, § 9(g); infra note 195 (reprinting the
student-athlete drug-testing consent form).
20. NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 3, § 9(g); NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 12
(reprinting § 3.0 which discusses the consequences of a student-athlete's refusal to sign a consent form).
21. See NCAA EXEc. REG. supra note 5, art. 1, § 7(a) (granting the Executive Committee power to authorize methods for drug-testing).
22. In order to eliminate the unreliability of testing procedures, the NCAA has contracted with the most modern and reliable testing laboratories. Neff, Bosworth Faces The
Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 24. These are the National Institute for Scientific Research at the University of Quebec, Montreal, and the University of California, at the
Los Angeles Medical Center. Lock & Jennings, The Constitutionalityof Mandatory StudentAthlete Drug Testing Programs: The Bounds of Privacy, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 581, 606 (1986).
In addition, only doctors and nurses are involved in the sample collection process. Id. Designated laboratories are "required to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the NCAA committee
responsible for drug testing, proficiency in detection and confirmation of the banned substance
categories on the NCAA list of banned-drug classes." NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at II12 (discussing the NCAA drug-testing program's organization). The NCAA intends to periodically conduct a quality control inspection of NCAA designated testing laboratories. Id. at 12.
The University of California believes its equipment is so sensitive, "it can tell if a spoonful of
sugar has been dumped in the water of an Olympic sized swimming pool .... " Neff, supra, at
24.
23. NCAA ExEc. REG., supra note 5, art. 1, § 7(b) (listing the NCAA banned drug
classes for 1988-89); see infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing the banned
drug classes and their effects).
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fled postseason football contests.2 As a result, drug-testing only oc-

curs shortly before or after championship events. 25 The NCAA may
require a student-athlete to submit a urine specimen based upon a
system of random selection, position of finish, suspicion, or playing
time.2 6 The method of selection which the NCAA intends to use, and
the particular postseason events where the NCAA intends to conduct

drug-testing, are provided in The NCAA News received by all member institutions.2 7 In addition, the details of subsequent modifications
are made available to member institutions.2
The urine specimen is divided into two bottles29 and is then sent
to a NCAA certified laboratory 30 which conducts a urinalysis of the
first sample by using a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry process. 31 Any positive result leads to the urinalysis of the same sample

by another laboratory staff member.3 2 If a similar positive result oc24. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N CONST., BYLAWS, art. 2, § 2(m)-(t)
(detailing the certification process) [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS]; see also supra note 5 (discussing when the Executive Committee may drug test student-athletes).
25. See supra note 5.
26. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 13. The NCAA drug-testing committee recommends the methods of selection which are then subject to the approval of the Executive Committee. Id. § 4.1. In football, the NCAA tests twenty-two players based on playing time and
fourteen based on reasonable suspicion. Telephone interview with Frank D. Uryasz, Director of
Sports Sciences at the NCAA National Office (Jan. 9, 1989) [hereinafter Uryasz Interview].
During the NCAA basketball tournament, the NCAA tests eight players from the first round
teams and then tests the two teams who compete in the final round. Selcraig, supra note 3, at
24. In NCAA track meets, the top three finishers in a particular race will be tested as will two
randomly selected athletes. Uryasz Interview, supra; see Selcraig, supra note 3 at 24. The
method of selection within a particular sport depends on the nature of that sport. Uryasz
Interview, supra. For instance, the selection of athletes based on position of finish would not be
feasible during a soccer championship.
27. NCAA EXEC. REG., art. 1, § 7(a); see also infra notes 221-24 and accompanying
text (discussing the NCAA's testing procedures in 1987 which provided member institutions
with sufficient notice).
28. NCAA EXEC REG., supra note 5, art. 1, § 7(a).
29. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 14 (reprinting § 5.2.6 "Specimen-Collection
Procedures").
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
32. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 16 (reprinting § 7.1.1 "Notification of Results"). By using different laboratory staff members, the NCAA intends to overcome possible
human errors. See Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, 16 J.
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGs 305, 313-14 (1984) (noting the problems with laboratory quality control); Stein, Laessig & lndriksons, An Evaluation of Drug Testing ProceduresUsed by Forensic Laboratoriesand the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 727, 730-40
(discussing the errors caused by instrumentation and unqualified personnel). Additionally, the
NCAA uses the most modern and accurate testing centers available. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
The NCAA's testing procedures are "very similar to those of the International Olympic
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curs, a subsequent urinalysis of the second specimen will be conducted.33 If the urinalysis of the second specimen is positive, the stu-

dent-athlete will be ineligible for further participation in postseason
competition 34 and if "the student-athlete tests positive after being
restored to eligibility, he or she shall be charged with the loss of one

season of postseason eligibility in all sports and shall remain ineligible for postseason competition at least through the succeeding aca''
demic year. 13

In addition to the detailed procedures concerning student selec-

tion,36 chain of custody,3 7 and notification of results, 38 the student-

athlete is given the precise results of the urinalysis and the opportunity to appeal his results within twelve hours of the analysis of the
first specimen.3 9 Lastly, the NCAA program has guidelines for the

release of information. Member institutions are not compelled to
publicly release the names of any athletes who test positive and

NCAA officials will only obtain and use enough information to propCommittee, which were drawn up in the late sixties, amended in the early seventies and have
since been well accepted by the International Sport Governing Bodies and several national
organizations." Affidavit of Dr. Robert Dugal, 1'25, at 13, O'Halloran v. University of Wash.,
679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter DUGAL AFFIDAVIT]. The procedures utilized by the International Olympic Committee are almost identical to the NCAA's testing procedures. See Johnson & Moore, The
Loser, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1988, at 26-27 (discussing the International Olympic
Committee's testing procedures as they related to Ben Johnson's urine specimen).
33. NCAA Pamphlet, supra note 8, at 16 (reprinting § 7.2.2.1 "Notification of Results"). The second specimen must be tested within 24 hours after telephone notification of the
student-athlete. Id.
34. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 5, § 2(a). The NCAA recommends the following statement should be released when inquiries are made concerning a student-athlete's ineligibility due to a positive finding: "The student athlete in question was found in violation of the
NCAA eligibility rules and has been declared ineligible for postseason competition." NCAA
PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 17 (reprinting § 7.5 "Notification of Results"). Member institutions keep positive results so confidential that it is virtually impossible to obtain accurate statistics. Uryasz Interview, supra note 26.
35. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 5, § 2(b).
36. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 13 (reprinting §§ 4.0-4.7 "Student Athlete
Selection").
37. See id. at 15 (reprinting §§ 6.0-6.3 "Chain of Custody").
38. See id. at 16-17 (reprinting §§ 7.0-7.5 "Notification of Results").
39. See id. at 16-17 (reprinting § 7.2.2.2, providing for a student-athlete's opportunity to
appeal). In addition, the student-athlete is given the opportunity to attend the testing of the
second specimen, or the NCAA will arrange for a surrogate to represent the student-athlete if
requested. Id. at 17 (reprinting §§ 7.2.2.3-7.2.2.4). The surrogate or the testing institutions
representative will attest by signature as to the code number on the second bottle as well as
attesting that the second specimen was not subject to tampering. Id. at 17 (reprinting §
7.2.2.5).
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erly decide if the individual should be declared ineligible.40 The information permitted to be utilized is outlined in the Buckley Amendment Consent 41 which the student-athlete signs along with a student
eligibility statement and the drug consent form.' 2
III.

STATE ACTION

The fourth amendment is enforceable against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 3 Under the
state action theory, the conduct must be sufficiently attributable to
the state in order for it to be susceptible to federal constitutional
restraints." In cases employing the theory, certain private entities
40. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 7. The NCAA consent form, reprinted infra
note 195, provides, in relevant part, the following: "You understand that this consent and the
results of your drug tests, if any, will only be disclosed in accordance with the Buckley Amendment Consent." Id.; see infra note 194 (discussing the Buckley Amendment Consent); see also
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding drug-testing
program unconstitutional where no guidelines for confidentiality existed); cf. Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (implying that individuals have a right to privacy in personal medical information); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(characterizing employee medical records as being within the ambit of materials entitled to
privacy protection).
41. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 6; see also infra note 194 (discussing the Buckley Amendment Consent).
42. See infra notes 193, 195 and accompanying text.
43. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949). The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, §1. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "the
Fourth Amendment 'is enforceable against ... [the states] by the same sanction of exclusion
as is used against the Federal Government,' by the application of the same constitutional standard prohibiting 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Id. at 30-31 (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 655).
44. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). The state action
requirement "assure[s] that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that
the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis in original). The fourteenth amendment does
not extend to "private conduct abridging individual rights." Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Consequently, the Supreme Court has definitively stated
that "[tihe Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948)); see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1981) (stating that the fourteenth
amendment "applies to acts of the states, not to acts of private persons or entities." (citing
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948))). As a
result, a fourth amendment claim may proceed only if the alleged conduct constitutes state
action. See Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 606 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that "[c]ritical
to Plaintiffs' Due Process and Equal Protection claims is the issue of whether the NCAA's
actions constitute state action."); O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1001
(W.D. Wash.) (noting state action is the first issue to be considered), rev'd on other grounds,
856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
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have been considered to be state actors and, therefore, susceptible to
federal constitutional restraints. 45 The determination of whether conduct is private action or state action can be decided only by analyzing all of the relevant facts and circumstances. 46 While a detailed
47
factual analysis of the NCAA is beyond the scope of this Note it
should be noted that the basis upon which earlier cases found the
NCAA to be a state actor 48 has been significantly eroded by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Blum v. Yaretsky,' 9 Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 50 and more recently, NCAA v. Tarkanian.1
Using an entanglement theory analysis, early cases found the
NCAA to be a state actor due to its extensive regulation and supervision of intercollegiate athletics.52 The entanglement theory is pre45. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (concluding that a private
park had a public character and therefore the trustees were treated as state actors); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961) (finding that a private restaurant
located on a publicly owned parking building was a state actor); Public Utils. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1952) (reasoning that a private railway company was a state
actor where it was regulated by the Public Utilities Commission); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13-14, 23 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a private agreement created state
action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (finding a privately owned town was
a state actor where it had all the attributes of a municipality). But cf.Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-59 (1974) (finding a private utility was not a state actor despite
heavy regulation by the state); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972)
(finding a private club was not a state actor despite its regulation by the state liquor board).
46. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that upon " ' sifting facts and weighing circumstances,' . . . the inquiry in each case is whether the conduct is
fairly attributable to the state." (citations omitted)); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213,
217 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 722); Hawkins, 653 F. Supp. at 606-07
(quoting Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 217).
47. For an exhaustive and factual analysis of state action theory and its application to
the NCAA, see Scanlan, Playingthe Drug-Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and the Structuresof ConstitutionalArgument, 62 IND. L.J. 863, 892-904 (1987) and
Martin, The NCAA And The Fourteenth Amendment, 11 NEW. ENG. L.J. 383, 393-96 (1975).
48. See, e.g., Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 217 (finding that the NCAA's conduct was
sufficiently entwined with governmental policies to make it state action); Parish v. NCAA, 506
F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the NCAA's activities constituted action
taken under the color of state law); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254
(9th Cir. 1974) (determining that the NCAA's regulatory operations showed sufficient evidence to lead to the existence of state action); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 298 (D.
Mass. 1975) (stating that, "actions of the N.C.A.A., declaring student-athletes ineligible to
participate in intercollegiate hockey, constituted state action .... ); Buckton v. NCAA, 366
F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Mass. 1973) (noting that private institutions, when performing action
that is governmental in nature, are constrained by the requirements of the Constitution).
49. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
50. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
51. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
52. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish
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mised on the idea that indirect involvement by state governments

could convert what would otherwise be private action into state action.53 In Blum v. Yaretsky, 5' however, the Court effectively eliminated this premise. 5 5 The question before the Court was whether a
nursing home's involuntary discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients without certain procedural safeguards constituted state action. 56 Although the nursing homes were extensively regulated and
funded by state officials, 57 the Court concluded that such behavior
by the state could not convert private conduct into conduct reasonably attributed to the State. 8 Only in limited circumstances where
there is a sufficient nexus between the alleged conduct and the state,
where the state has exercised coercive power, or where significant
encouragement influences the alleged conduct, will the state be held
responsible for conduct that is otherwise private. 9 In addition, the
Court noted the requisite nexus may exist if the private entity exercises a power traditionally attributed to the state.6 ° Similarly, in
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,61 the Court relied on the Blum analysis in
v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251
(9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975); Buckton v. NCAA, 366
F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973); accord Note, Drugs, Athletes And The NCAA: A Proposed
Rule For Mandatory Drug Testing In College Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 205, 213-17
(1984) (authored by James B. Ford).
53. Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986). An entanglement theory
analysis will find the contested conduct to be state action where "[c]onduct that is formally
'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Howard Univ., 510 F.2d at 217 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
In short, the private actor is so intertwined with the state entity that the private actor is
considered to be engaged in a public function. The entanglement theory developed from a line
of cases known as the "high school athletic program cases." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp.
602, 607 (C.D. 111.1987) (discussing the high school athletic program cases).
54. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
55. Id. at 1004.
56. Id. at 1003.
57. Id. at 1004.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id; see e.g., Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
the NCAA is performing a traditional governmental function and if "the NCAA were to disappear tomorrow, [the] government would soon step in to fill the void."); Howard Univ. v.
NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding the NCAA to be governmental in
character). But see Scanlan, supra note 47, at 901 (stating that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the NCAA can only be attributed to the "general will of the NCAA's mixed
membership" and therefore were not conduct reasonably attributed to a uniform governmental

body).
61.

457 U.S. 830 (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 17:641

order to find that no state action existed.6 2 The issue in Rendell-

Baker was whether a private school's discharge of employees constituted state action."3 Although the private school received funds from
the state and was required to comply with various state regulations,

neither the state's funding nor the existence of extensive regulations
could convert the school's conduct into state action. 64 Moreover, the

school's decision to discharge employees was neither compelled nor
influenced by the existing state regulations.6 5 Although the school's

role as an educator was a public function, it was not a function exclusively attributed to the state.66

Relying upon Blum and Rendell-Baker, several courts have subsequently concluded that the NCAA is not a state actor.6 7 In
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 68 the Fourth Circuit found the NCAA's regulatory function was not coerced or directed by state regulations or
funding," and the alleged conduct was not traditionally reserved to

the State.70 It was "not enough that an institution is highly regulated
and subsidized by a state. If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing
function does not order or cause the action complained of, and the
function is not one traditionally reserved to the state, there is no
state action." 71
62. Id. at 839-43.
63. Id. at 838.
64. Id. at 840-41. Utilizing the Blum analysis, the Court noted the relationship between
the school and its staff did not change despite the state funding of tuition. Id.
65. Id. at 841.
66. Id. at 842. Once the conduct is considered to be a public function, the inquiry does
not stop. Only when the conduct is a function which is "'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State ... '" will state action be held to exist. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
67. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Graham v.
NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp.
997, 1001-02 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Hawkins
v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 609 (C.D. III. 1987); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67,
70 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
68. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 1022; see also supra note 67 (listing cases rejecting the entanglement theory).
70. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022.
71. Id; accord Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); O'Halloran v.
University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d
1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 609 (C.D. III. 1987); McHale v.
Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Lock & Jennings, supra note
22, at 584-87 (1986) (discussing the inapplicability of the state action theory to the NCAA);
Scanlan, supra note 47, at 897-902 (discussing the inapplicability of the state action theory to
the NCAA). Significantly, the court in Arlosoroff noted that "earlier cases rested upon the
notion that indirect involvement of state governments could convert what otherwise would be
considered private conduct into state action. That notion has now been rejected by the Su-
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7 2 the question before the Court was
In NCAA v. Tarkanian,
whether the NCAA's influence over the conduct of a state university

converted the NCAA into a state actor. 73 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court rejected the theory that a state university's adoption of
NCAA rules could transform the NCAA into a state actor since the
NCAA was unable to "directly discipline Tarkanian or any other
state university employee."'74 In addition, the Court rejected the assertion that the NCAA's rule making authority was a traditional
government function."
Although the Court in Tarkanian rejected the argument that
rules and regulations directing a public university's disciplinary actions were state action, the question still remains open in the context
of the NCAA drug-testing program since it directly disciplines the
individual rather than the university. 76 If the NCAA's disciplinary
sanctions are activities traditionally associated with a public university, the NCAA may be engaging in conduct reasonably attributed
to the state. 77 Consequently, this Note assumes the NCAA to be a

state actor in order to examine the important fourth amendment issues raised by the NCAA drug-testing program. In addition, a

search and seizure analysis remains relevant since a plaintiff precluded from asserting a federal constitutional claim may still challenge the NCAA program based upon the relevant state constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.78
preme Court, however, and its decisions require a different conclusion." 746 F.2d at 1021.
72. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 465 n.18.
76. The Court in Tarkanian noted that lower federal courts have unanimously held the
NCAA not to be a state actor subsequent to the Court's decisions in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 109 S. Ct. at 457 n.5. As
the dissent correctly pointed out, however, none of those cases addressed the theory which was
before the Court in Tarkanian.Id. at 467 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). In addition, the facts in
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984), "on which the subsequent decisions principally rely," would not have raised the issue which was before the Court in Tarkanian.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467 n.2 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 67 (listing those cases
rejecting the entanglement theory).
77. As the Court noted in Tarkanian, "[a] state university without question is a state
actor. When it decides to impose a serious disciplinary sanction ... it must comply with the
terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
Id. at 462 (citing Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also supra notes 60-62, 66 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., LeVant v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super. Ct., March 10, 1987) (no
published opinion) (challenging the NCAA drug-testing program as an invasion of privacy
under the California state constitution which affords its citizens a greater right to privacy). In
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Urine Testing as a Search Under the Fourth Amendment

The primary purpose of the fourth amendment 9 is to secure the
rights of individuals 80 against unreasonable searches and seizures."'
Consequently, a fourth amendment anyalysis of the NCAA's drugtesting program must begin with the determination of whether the
taking of urine for the purposes of drug analysis constitutes a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
A search occurs when an intrusion violates an expectation of privacy
that society considers reasonable.8 2 A seizure takes place when there

is a meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest
83
in the object being seized.

LeVant, a temporary restraining order was granted when Simone LeVant, captain of the
women's diving team at Stanford University, challenged the constitutionality of the NCAA
program. See NCAA Wants Drug Testing, Newsday, Aug. 12, 1988, at 157, col. 1; Incident or
Precedent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 23, 1987, at 18; Newman, Another NCAA Fumble,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 7, 1987, at 100. Although the court found certain aspects of the
NCAA program to be unconstitutional, the challenge came under the California state constitution which, "unlike the fourth amendment, grants individuals an explicit right of privacy, not
merely one that is implicit or penumbral." Brock & McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92
DICK. L. REV.505, 547 (1988) (footnote omitted); see Scanlan, supra note 47, at 902 (asserting that plaintiffs may still prevail under the relevant state constitution); cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (permitting the plaintiffs to bring a first amendment claim under the state constitution despite the inability of the plaintiff to bring the same
claim under the federal constitution for lack of state action).
79. The Supreme Court has determined that "[tihe essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' . . . in order 'to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.'" Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967)) (footnotes omitted); see supra note 9 (quoting the fourth amendment).
80. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court concluded that
the "Fourth Amendment protects people- and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches
and seizures ...." Id. at 353.
81. The fourth amendment is not a general prohibition of all searches and seizures. The
Constitution only prohibits those searches determined to be unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968); see infra notes 207-57 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness
test and its application to the NCAA).
82. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1497 (1987). Legitimate expectations of privacy will differ according to the factual circumstances. Id. As the Court noted in O'Connor.
We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that
society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Instead, "the Court has given weight to
such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment ...and our
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection
from government invasion."
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
83. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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In Schmerber v. California,84 the Supreme Court determined
that the involuntary taking of blood was a search, and therefore the
searching entity was required to meet the reasonableness standard
under the fourth amendment.8 5 The Court reasoned that since the
extraction of blood by the police was an intrusion into the human

body, the intrusion was held to be a search and seizure."
Unlike the extraction of blood, however, an individual routinely
discharges urine as a waste product.87 Consequently, the taking of
urine is unlikely to be characterized as a seizure since the submission
of urine for drug-testing does not normally interfere with an individual's possessory interest in that urine.88 Nevertheless, in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.,89 the Supreme Court recently determined that the taking of blood or urine for purposes of drug-testing can be characterized as a search because an individual has an
expectation of privacy concerning the information which such analysis may reveal.90 Similar to the extraction of blood, an individual
84. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
85. Id. at 767.
86. Id. at 767-70.
87. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987), ajfd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that "urine excreted
for a drug test ... is not expected to be a waste product, flushed down the toilet. Indeed,
precautions are taken in the test procedure to prevent the sample from being thus disposed of."

Id.
88. Id. at 176 (noting that compulsory urine testing is unlikely to be characterized as a
seizure). Most courts that address the issue of whether the testing of urine for the presence of
drugs is a search focus on the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy rather than
whether a meaningful interference with and individual's possessory interest in their urine has
occurred. However, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413
(1989), the Supreme Court stated that "[tiaking a blood or urine sample might also be characterized as a Fourth Amendment seizure, since it may be viewed as a meaningful interference
with the [individual's] possessory interest in his bodily fluids." Id. Nonetheless, since the Court
already concluded that the submission of urine for drug testing was a search, the Court did not
find it necessary to characterize the intrusion as a seizure. Id. at 1413 n.4. In Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1010-11 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, J., concurring), Associate
Justice Nebeker found urine testing was not a search, but concluded that the "appropriate
analysis begins with determining whether the seizure of urine interferes with the affected officer's possessory interest in that urine." Id. Pursuant to this analysis, Justice Nebeker concluded that the submission of urine was not a seizure under the fourth amendment. Id.; see
supra text accompanying note 83.
89. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
90. Id. at 1413. While the Court in Skinner noted that the submission of urine for drugtesting was not a surgical intrusion beneath the skin like the blood testing procedure in
Schmerber, the "chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood can reveal a host of private
medical facts .... " Id. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "[i]n a civilized society, one's anatomy is draped with constitutional protections." United States v. Afanador, 567 F. 2d 1325,
1331 (5th Cir. 1978). Individuals additionally have a constitutional right to privacy concerning

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:641

"does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances

making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as part of a
' Urination itself is considered to be an exmedical examination." 91
tremely private activity. "There are few activities in our society more
personal or private than the passing of urine .

. .

. It is a function

traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social
custom."9
Lastly, when a particular intrusion violates a legitimate expectation of privacy, courts are additionally concerned with the existence of unbridled discretion and lack of standards.9 If the submission of urine for drug-testing was not determined to be a search,
these concerns, which reflect the underlying purposes of the fourth
amendment, 9 would be seriously undermined. In effect, a court
would be permitting a particular entity unbridled discretion. The
searching party would not be required to adhere to any standards or
procedures considered constitutionally reasonable at the expense of
personal medical information. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
91. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), affd as modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); see Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513
(D.N.J. 1986).
Despite an individual's privacy interest in the information which the urine specimen may
reveal, the submission of urine for drug testing is not violative of the fifth amendment which
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, cl. 3. In Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765,
the Supreme Court held that use of blood test results did not infringe upon the fifth amendment since blood test results are neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing ....
Id; see Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510,
1527-28 (D. Neb. 1987), afl'd, 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Scanlan, supra note 47, at 905-06.
92. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), affd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
93. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (stating that the primary
purpose of the fourth amendment is to prevent unbridled and standardless invasions); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (holding that administrative searches for health
concerns require the issuance of a warrant); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1520 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that the plaintiffs were unconstitutionally subjected to the unbridled discretion of their government employers); Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp.
875, 881-82 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (invalidating a drug-testing program where no standards whatsoever existed for implementing drug-testing program), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988);
see infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of standards limiting
the scope and discretion of the tester).
94. The primary purpose of the fourth amendment is to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara, 387
U.S. at 528, see supra note 79.
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the substantial privacy interest associated with the submission of
urine for drug-testing. 9 Consequently, in Skinner the Supreme
Court agreed with the general consensus among those courts who
have addressed the issue and concluded that urinalysis should be
characterized as a search for the purposes of the fourth
amendment.9
B. Requirements Under the Fourth Amendment
In general, the fourth amendment requires that a search be con97
ducted pursuant to a search warrant based upon probable cause.
95. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 176 (noting that if a search or
seizure were not found, the government would be receiving a virtual "carte blanche" to drug
test individuals).
96. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413. It is well established that "[u]rinalysis drug testing is a
search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The federal and state courts
that have ruled on the constitutionality of urinalysis drug testing have been virtually unanimous in this conclusion." Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956, 958 (D. Mass. 1988); accord
Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Drug and AIDS Testing, 32 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 40, 42 (1987) (finding almost every court which has addressed the issue has concluded that urinalysis is a search); see, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at
170; Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988); O'Halloran v.
University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d
1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D.
Ind. 1988), affid, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986),
aft'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga.
1985); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), ajfd as modified, 809 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Turner v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.
2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). But see Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1554 (Guy, J., dissenting).
Judge Guy begins with the premise that "'[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.'" Id. at 1552
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Thus, as Judge Guy states, "ft]he
real question . . . is the interplay between voluntary and involuntary 'exposure' within the
context of the fourth amendment." Id. at 1554. Since an employee voluntarily donates a urine
sample at the request of the employer, fourth amendment protections are not invoked. Id. at
1552.
Several courts have accepted that the submission of urine is a search under the fourth
amendment without questioning or independently analyzing the issue. See National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d
753 (8th Cir. 1986); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Long Island R.R. Co., 651 F. Supp.
1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119
A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), atd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E. 2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d
456 (1987).
97. See National TreasuryEmployees Union, 109 S. Ct. at 1391; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1414; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). The fourth amendment states in relevant part: "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ... and no warrants shall issue, but on probable
cause .... " US. CONST. amend. IV.
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The primary purpose of the warrant requirement is to protect individuals from arbitrary and standardless searches by law enforcement
officers in the fieldY8 Without a warrant, a searching entity may intrude upon an individual's privacy without any justification or belief
that incriminating evidence will be found. By substituting the judgment of the individual conducting the search with the judgment of a
disinterested judge or magistrate, the warrant requirement effectively eliminates the possibility of arbitrary and standardless
invasions. 9
The probable cause standard ensures that a search or seizure
will only take place where the intruding entity can point to specific
facts and circumstances surrounding a particular person which justifies the intrusion.1 00 The mere possibility of discovering incriminating evidence has never been considered constitutionally reasonable.1 01 Although the probable cause standard has generally been
required in the criminal context,10 2 the Supreme Court has determined that even in circumstances where a search or seizure is not
done for criminal purposes, "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure."' 0 a
In the context of drug testing, the requirement of individualized sus98. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415; United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297, 316 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see supra notes 79, 94
(discussing the fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment); infra notes 228-31 (citing
cases where courts' concern was arbitrary and unbridled discretion).
99. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1415; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14. As the Court noted
in Terry:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.
392 U.S. at 21 (footnote omitted).
100. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968). The
requirement of specificity is central to the Supreme Court's "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 21 n.18. For a partial listing of Supreme Court cases requiring particularized
suspicion, see id. at 21 n.18.
101. An individual's interest "in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbids any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); see also Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding a search unreasonable where drugtesting was conducted on the mere possibility of discovering misconduct).
102. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 85.
103. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560 (1976)); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1392
(1989).
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picion has traditionally been termed "reasonable suspicion."' 104 Although the Supreme Court has continually emphasized that searches
conducted without a warrant are per se unconstitutional,10 5 a few
well defined exceptions have been developed.'0 6 In developing these
exceptions, the Supreme Court has taken a practical approach. 0 7

Consequently, a warrant may be dispensed with under those circumstances where special needs make the warrant requirement impracti104. "Reasonable suspicion" is "individualized suspicion, specifically directed to the person who is targeted for the search." Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517
(D.N.J. 1986) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875,
880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afJ'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (D.C. 1985); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Iowa 1985), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,
475 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). A reasonable suspicion standard recognizes
the difficulties which would be involved if an employer were required to learn the complexities
of a probable cause standard. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987) (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
105. In Skinner, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that "[e]xcept in certain well defined circumstances, a search or seizure ... is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1414 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978)); accord National TreasuryEmployees Union, 109 S. Ct. at 1391; see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 nn.18 & 19 (1967) (discussing the line of cases holding
warrantless searches to be per se unconstitutional and noting the limited exceptions); Camara
v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (noting that the warrantless search has consistently been held to be unreasonable).
106. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding school officials did
not need a warrant to search student's property); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (dispensing with warrant requirement under certain circumstances where incriminating
conduct is in plain view of law enforcement officer and discovery of the evidence is inadvertent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that warrant was not required where stop and
frisk search was necessary); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (noting in dicta that
no warrant is required where search is incidental to lawful arrest); see also infra note 110 and
accompanying text (discussing the consent exception); infra notes 114-28 and accompanying
text (discussing the warrant exception applying to administrative searches of closely regulated
industries).
As the Sixth Circuit noted, "[w]hether these exceptions have any common thread or not is
debatable, but one way of analyzing them is to note that in each exception there is something
about the relationship of the searcher to the searchee or the purpose of the search that calls for
a less stringent application of the fourth amendment." Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 846
F.2d 1539, 1554-55 (6th Cir. 1988).
107. In Griffen v. Wisconsin, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987), the Court observed that
"[although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and
thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), we have permitted exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" Id. at 3167 (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (citations omitted)); accord Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414. In
Skinner, the court further noted that when special needs existed, the Court has "not hesitated
to balance the governmental and privacy interest to assess the practicality of the warrant and
probable cause requirements in the particular context." Id.
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cable.' 08 The necessity of a warrant requirement based on probable
cause has been dispensed with in circumstances where "the burden
of obtaining the warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,"'09 there is consent, 10 or the search is made
pursuant to a well-defined administrative regulatory scheme."1 '
However, where warrantless searches have been permitted, courts

have generally required probable cause or individualized suspicion."'
Despite this general requirement, the Supreme Court has not conclusively stated that individualized suspicion is an irreducible requirement of a valid search."13 Random searches have been permitted
108. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1500 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). As the Ninth Circuit noted, "[a]lIthough a warrant is
generally required to make a search reasonable, it is not the sine qua non of reasonableness."
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 582 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
109. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 533 (1967)).
110. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). In order for consent to be
valid, it must be voluntary. In order to determine if consent is voluntary, a court must often
undergo a difficult and amorphous case-by-case analysis involving all the facts and circumstances. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 593-596 (N.D.
Ohio 1987) (discussing implied and actual consent in the context of drug-testing). For an
analysis of the consent doctrine as it relates to college athletic drug-testing programs, see
Note, An Analysis of Public College Athlete Drug Testing Programs Through the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 815 (1987) (authored by Sally Lynn Meloch).
11. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
112. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985); see, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1547 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring reasonable suspicion in order for
city to drug test fire fighters); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1988)
(holding U.S. Army testing of civilian employees to be unconstitutional absent reasosnable,
individualized suspicion); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1443 (N.D. I11.1987) (testing of correctional officers unconstitutional without reasonable suspicion); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (testing of municipal bus drivers unconstitutional without reasonable suspicion); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (finding program unconstitutional when testing of police academy cadets was not based on reasonable suspicion); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986) (testing of fire fighters unreasonable without particularized suspicion); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp. 726, 733 (S. D. Ga. 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion in order for drug-testing
program to be constitutional); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
119 A.D.2d 35, 39, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (2d Dep't 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion
to test public school teachers), affid, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987).
113. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967). In T.L.O., the Court noted that "[wihere a careful balancing of governmental and
private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such
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where "the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and

where 'other safeguards' are available 'to assure that the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of
the official in the field.' "114 The latter exception to the warrant re-

quirement, generally labeled the administrative search exception,11 5
embraces these requirements and has been utilized in order to justify6
a warrantless search without the requisite individualized suspicion."1
C.

The Administrative Search Exception

The administrative search exception has traditionally been applied to searches of property in order to further the purposes of, or
enhance compliance with, a regulatory scheme."1 However, the administrative search exception has recently been applied and analogized to random drug-testing programs involving government employees, 1" 8 employees in potentially dangerous situations,"1 9 and

a standard." 469 U.S. at 341.
114. Id. at 342 n.8 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)). Because
the searches were conducted on the basis of individualized suspicion, the Court did not find it
necessary to decide whether a search without individualized suspicion was unconstitutional. Id.
115. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), ajfd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the "Supreme Court
has ... recognized that, to ensure compliance with a regulatory scheme applicable to highly
regulated industries, the government may undertake inspections . . . without any degree of
individualized suspicion." 816 F.2d at 179 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Schail v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) the Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court "has approved of warrantless, suspicionless searches of commercial premises operating in certain 'heavily regulated industries.'" Id. at 1309.
116. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1981) (finding an administrative
search did not require a warrant); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (finding
administrative search did not require a warrant or individualized suspicion).
117. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2643 (1987) (upholding an administrative search under a statute authorizing warrantless inspections of a vehicle dismantling
businesses); Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603-06 (finding a search under the Mine Safety and Health
Act constitutional absent a warrant); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (allowing warrantless searches
under the Gun Control Act); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76
(1970) (concluding that "Contress has broad power to design ... powers of inspection under
liquor laws.").
118. See National Treasury Employees Union 816 F.2d at 170 (Customs Service employees); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Department of Transportation employees); see also Kessler, U.S. Orders Drug Testing,
Newsday, Nov. 15, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
119. See Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1988) (police officers); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988)
(power plant employees); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (Department of
Corrections employees).
Several courts have focused on the hazards associated with a particular employment setting in order to uphold the constitutionality of a random drug-testing program. See, e.g., Jones
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jockeys.12 0
Unlike the traditional balancing approach utilized by courts to
reach a particular standard of reasonableness, 12 1 the administrative
search exception requires no standard of individualized suspicion and
only necessitates that the search should be reasonable. 1 22 Courts considering the administrative search exception have emphasized several
important factors.1 2 In each situation there existed highly regulated
industries 24 coupled with strong governmental interests in conv. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that the transportation of handicapped
children raised serious safety concerns); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (finding the hazards associated with transportation workers created safety concerns for the well-being of others).
120. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986). In Shoemaker, the Third Circuit set forth two requirements which were necessary to
justify a random search: "First, there must be a strong state interest in conducting an unannounced search. Second, the pervasive regulation of the industry must have reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the subject of the search." Id. at 1142 (citing Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)). The test in Shoemaker is in accordance with Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the administrative search exception. See infra note 123.
However, the Shoemaker decision is not without criticism. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1545 (6th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734-35 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and
the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PiTT. L. REv. 201, 228-31 (1986).
121. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing approach).
The standards courts commonly arrived at are probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Probable cause is the strictest standard, while mere suspicion (random selection) is the least stringent. See supra text accompanying note 100 (defining probable cause); supra note 104 (defining reasonable suspicion). Generally, some amount of individualized suspicion is necessary in
order to find a search constitutional under the fourth amendment. United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976); see supra note 112. However, there is "no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id. at 561; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
283-85 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
123. In New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987), the Supreme Court set forth
certain criteria necessary to find a warrantless inspection in a pervasively regulated area constitutionally reasonable. First, there must be a substantial government interest in the regulatory scheme in which the inspection is made. Id. at 2644; see infra notes 163-86 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's substantial interest). Second, the searches must "'further
[the] regulatory scheme.'" 107 S. Ct. at 2644 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600
(1981)); see infra note 170 (asserting that random selection is the only effective method of
furthering the NCAA's regulatory purpose). Third, there must be procedural safeguards which
inform the individual "that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly
defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers." 107 S. Ct. at 2644
(citations omitted); see infra notes 232-57 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's
procedural safeguards and limited scope).
124. Areas of pervasive regulation are usually found where the intruding body "has historically exercised its rule making authority in ways that reduce the justifiable privacy expectation of participants .... " Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J.
1986) (citing Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
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ducting warrantless searches. 2 5 The regulations involving the drug-

testing programs were restricted in scope, and were instituted with
the intention of improving the health or safety of the individual as

well as the public's perception of the industry.126 Moreover, the
577 (1986)); see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989)
(noting that "the expectations of privacy ... are diminished by reason of ... participation in
an industry that is regulated pervasively ....
); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1394 (1989) (noting that "customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs . . . have a diminished expectation of privacy in
respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test."); Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2642-43; Donovan
452 U.S. at 600; United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844
F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d
133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1136. Compare Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at
1142 (applying the administrative search exception where pervasive regulation lowered the
justifiable privacy expectations of individuals to be drug-tested) with Capua, 643 F. Supp. at
1518-19 (refusing to apply the administrative search exception to the challenged drug-testing
program where no closely regulated industry existed) and Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D. 2d 35, 39, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (1986) (holding
that the profession of teaching is not a persuasively regulated industry) affd 70 N.Y. 2d 57,
510 N.E. 2d 325, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 456 (1987). In Capua,the court noted the Shoemaker exception, which applied the administrative search exception to individuals, was narrowly tailored to
the "circumstances surrounding 'closely regulated industries'" Id. at 1518.
The pervasive regulation distinction does not limit itself solely to the length of time which
the industry has been subject to the regulations. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605-06. Rather, the
Supreme Court has stated "the doctrine is essentially defined by the 'pervasiveness and regularity of the regulation and the effect of such regulation upon an [individual's] expectation of
privacy." Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600, 606)). Nonetheless,
the duration of the regulatory scheme is still a relevant factor "in deciding whether a warrantless inspection pursuant to the scheme is permissible." Id. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 606).
125. See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2644 (1987); Donovan at 452 U.S. at 602; Biswell, 406
U.S. at 315; Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75; Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. In
Sehaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1988), the
court noted several important factors influencing the Supreme Court's approval and application of the administrative search exception to commercial premises. The regulatory scheme
authorizing the "search must further substantial governmental interest" and "warrantless, suspicionless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme ...
I."
Id. Although
the Supreme Court has traditionally applied the administrative search doctrine to searches of
commercial enterprises, the court stated that the "Supreme Court has contrued [sic] and applied the same constitutional provision" in the administrative search cases, and therefore the
Seventh Circuit found these factors relevant to the constitutionality of the challenged drugtesting program. Id. at 21.
In Shoemaker, the Third Circuit went even further by literally applying the administrative search exception to individuals 795 F.2d at 1141-42. In accordance with the Supreme
Court, the Third Circuit similarly required "a strong state interest in conducting an unannounced search." Id. at 1142 (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).
126. See Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1988); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Shoemaker
v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); see also infra notes
163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's concern with safety and the public's
perception).
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searches were conducted for administrative rather than criminal purposes."2 Under the administrative search doctrine, these factors en-

able a court to find warrantless and random searches reasonable because the fundamental policies underlying the fourth amendment
28
remain secured.1

1. Shoemaker v. Handel.-Areas of pervasive regulation are
usually found where the searching party has utilized its rule-making
authority to the extent of lowering the individual's expectancy of privacy.1 29 In those circumstances, individuals are put on notice that
they will continually be subjected to the intrusive rule-making authority of the regulating entity. 30
In Shoemaker v. Handel,'3 ' the court was confronted with the
issue of whether to apply the administrative search exception to the

drug-testing of jockeys. 32 Although the court noted that several distinctions existed between the traditional application of the administrative search exception to property rather than the application of
the exception to individuals, 133 the court did not find these differences significant since the jockeys were the primary concern of the
127. See cases cited supra note 126; see also infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text
(discussing the administrative nature of the NCAA drug-testing program).
128. See supra notes 79-81, 94 (discussing the fundamental purposes of the fourth
amendment). The fundamental basis underlying the administrative search exception "is that
searches not conducted as part of a typical police investigation to secure evidence of crime but
as part of a general regulatory scheme, one applying standardized procedures negating the
potential for arbitrariness, need not be based on individualized suspicion (nor, sometimes, be
authorized by warrants)." Kamisar, supra note 96, at 44.
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (holding that when a dealer
chooses to engage in a pervasively regulated industry, the individual certainly expects the intrusive authority of the regulating entity to be exercised); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850
F.2d at 137 (finding police department's regulations lowered police officers' expectation of privacy); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1306 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding corrections officers'
subjective expectations of privacy' diminished while in prison); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 180 (5th Cir. 1987), af'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (noting
that individuals in the Customs Service know inquiries may be made concerning drug use);
Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 (finding the Racing Commission exercised its rule-making authority to reduce the jockeys' expectations of privacy); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist.,
653 F. Supp 1510, 1524 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
plaintiffs had a lowered expectation of privacy due to pervasive and comprehensive regulatory
scheme). But cf. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding
no previous intrusive exercise of regulatory power and, therefore, no notice that plaintiffs
would be subject to intrusive searches).
131. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
132. Id. Traditionally, the administrative search exception has applied to the inspection
of property and industries rather than individuals. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
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Racing Commission's extensive regulations governing licensing and
ethical conduct.134 In addition, the jockeys entered the industry voluntarily and were fully aware they would be subjected to these regulations."' The purposes behind the regulations were crucial to the
court's reasoning. In particular, the court focused on the program's
goals of preserving the integrity in the racing industry and promoting fairness in competition as it related to the wagering public."' 6
Unlike the warrantless search situation where a search is unannounced, the jockeys received notice that they would be subjected to
warrantless and random drug-testing. a7 As a result, the extensive
rules promulgated by the Racing Commission lowered the jockeys'
expectation of privacy, and thereby justified the application of the
administrative search exception to persons engaged in the horse racing industry. 3 '
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.- In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,'39 the court considered the constitutionality of a random drug-testing program directed
at individuals within the United States Customs Service. 140 The
Fifth Circuit focused on the purposes underlying the administrative
141
search exception rather than the doctrine's literal requirements.
Although the employees did not participate in a highly regulated industry,1 42 the court analogized to the purposes underlying the
regulated industry distinction.143 The search was administrative in
nature and not conducted to gather evidence for a criminal investigation which might have resulted in punitive measures.4 Focusing on
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1141-42. The court noted that since the viability of the horse racing industry
was dependent upon the public's perception of the industry, the racing commission had a

strong interest in assuring the fairness in competition. Id.
137.

Id. at 1142.

138.

Id.

139.
140.

816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), afl'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
Id.

141.

Id. at 174-82.

142. Id. at 180.
143. Id.; supra note 124 (discussing the pervasively regulated distinction as it relates to
the administrative search doctrine). But see Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539,

1545-46 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[t]o allow widespread mandatory drug testing of individuals by analogizing it to the relaxed standards governing . . . searches of places allowed
under the administrative search warrant exception fundamentally misapprehends that
doctrine.").
144.

National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 179. The court reasoned that the

need for protections against a particular intrusion is lessened where the purpose of the search
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the individuals' lowered expectation of privacy, individuals who
sought these positions knew the Customs Service would utilize its
regulatory power to investigate drug use by employees seeking certain high security positions. 45 The employment positions were voluntary and an employee could refuse to be drug tested without an inference of guilt or the application of punitive measures." The only
consequence of refusing to be tested would be the withdrawl of the
application for the position requested.'" Similar to the Racing Commission in Shoemaker,148 the Customs Service has historically enacted rules and regulations, including the drug-testing program, in
order to maintain the Custom Service's integrity. ' 9 As a result, the
random drug-testing of employees seeking to be transferred to more
sensitive positions was held not to be constitutionally
unreasonable. 50
3. Capua v. City of Plainfield.- Despite providing an exception

to the requirement of individualized suspicion, the administrative
search exception should not be used as a blanket justification for all
random drug-testing programs. 15' In Capua v. City of Plainfield,152
the defendants unsuccessfully relied upon Shoemaker to justify the
urinalysis testing of fire fighters without individualized suspicion.' 53
Although the court refused to apply the administrative search excepis to carry out an administrative scheme. Id. Thus, the random drug-testing of Customs Service employees requesting transfers to certain sensitive positions did not require a warrant or
probable cause. Id. at 179 n.49. In addition, the court noted the Supreme Court's acceptance
of searches pursuant to an administrative scheme without a warrant or individualized suspicion. Id. at 179 nn.52 & 53; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (distinguishing a search for the purposes of a criminal investigation from a purely administrative
search).
145. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 178.
146. Id. The concept of voluntariness relates to the administrative nature of the search
and indicates, to a certain extent, the existence of adequate notice. Since the positions were
voluntary, those who chose to seek employment for these positions knew in advance they would
be drug-tested. In addition, employees voluntarily seeking these employment positions would
not be penalized if the individual withdrew his or her application. Id.; see supra note 110
(discussing the concept of voluntariness in the context of the warrant requirement).
147. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 178.
148. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
149. National Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 179.
150. Id. at 182.
151. Yale Kamisar, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, exemplifies a growing concern surrounding the use of the administrative search exception: "The serviceability of
the administrative search concept has gladdened government lawyers, but has alarmed others,
including me. 'Administrative search' is swarming around the Fourth Amendment like bees.
And the drone may soon be deafening." Kamisar, supra note 97, at 45.
152. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
153. Id. at 1518-19.
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tion,15 4 its holding is significant because of the factors it utilized to
distinguish the drug-testing program in Shoemaker from the random
drug-testing of fire fighters. As in Shoemaker and Von Raab, the

court focused on the individuals' legitimate expectations of privacy.
The fire fighters were not traditionally subjected to intrusive regulatory authority by the city.15 5 They had no notice or knowledge that

the defendants would exercise their supervisory authority to conduct
random drug-testing. 56 Unlike the jockeys in Shoemaker and the
employees in Von Raab, the fire fighters in Capua were not given the
opportunity to make an informed employment decision "based on the
knowledge that they might be required to submit to intrusive government intervention on the job."' 57 In addition, the plaintiffs in Capua
were charged with criminal misconduct rather than being subjected
to administrative disciplinary procedures.' 58 The fire department's
interest in random testing was found unpersuasive.' 59 The public
might have been concerned with the integrity of the fire fighting profession, but the ability of the fire fighters did not depend upon this
perception. Even if the public's perception was negative, the fire
fighters would still be able to effectively carry out their responsibilities. Consequently, rather than permitting random selection, the
court concluded that the requirement of individualized suspicion
would not significantly impair the defendant's interest in drug-testing the fire fighters. 6 0

154. Id. The court noted that the exception created in Shoemaker was applicable only to
voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry. Id. (citing Shoemaker v. Handel, 795
F.2d 1136, 1142 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986)). But see supra notes 139-50
and accompanying text (applying the administrative search exception due to the individual's
lowered expectation of privacy, as opposed to the highly regulated nature of the industry).
155. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1519.
156. Id.
157. Id. The voluntary nature or ability to make an informed decision is crucial to a
court's finding that the individual received adequate notice. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 1512.
159. Id. at 1519. The City of Plainfield was "not seeking to combat public perception of
'untoward influence' undermining its fire force." Id. As a result, the state's interest in departmentwide urinalysis was not compelling. Id. at 1519-20.
160. Id. at 1519. The procedures concerning the selection of fire fighters and the Plainfield Fire Department's satisfactory performance created the public's positive perception. Id.
There was nothing to indicate the existence of a drug problem affecting the fire fighters' abilities and performances. Id.
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DRUG-TESTING PROGRAM

A.

The Administrative Search Exception

1. The Warrant Requirement.- Similar to other drug-testing
programs, the NCAA drug-testing program does not require a warrant as a prerequisite to conducting urinalysis. It is unlikely that the
NCAA will be required to obtain a warrant due to the applicability
of the administrative search exception, or because the burden of obtaining a warrant will frustrate the purposes of the search." 1 While
the latter exception will only permit a search to be conducted without a warrant, the administrative search exception eliminates the necessity of a warrant and the requirement of particularized suspicion.16 2 Consequently, the application of the administrative search
exception will permit the NCAA to conduct not only warrantless
searches, but searches not based on reasonable suspicion.
2. The NCAA's Interest.-The NCAA has a substantial interest in the random drug-testing of student-athletes. The public's perception of intercollegiate athletics is crucial to the viability and continued support of college sports.1 63 The primary purposes of the
161. Despite the lack of a warrant, "[wihere the purpose of the search is to detect illegal
substances in the body, it is undisputed that the delay of obtaining a warrant could frustrate
that purpose." Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Mass. 1988); see Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash.,
672 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988);
supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the warrant requirement); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (discussing reasons why a warrant
is both unnecessary and undesireable in a school setting).
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), the Court recognized "that the Government's interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its
strongest when ... the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search." Id. at 1416 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
533 (1967)).
162. See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
163. Dr. Robert Dugal, member of the International Olympic Committee Medical Commission and director of the drug-testing programs at the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympic
Games and the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games, comments on the importance of the
public's perception of intercollegiate competition and the influence of drugs upon this
perception:
[T]he profile and popularity of collegiate sport is such that revelations of drug misuse by athletes at the higher levels of competition have an immediate adverse effect
on the entire sport community and society at large. The health of athletes is
threatened; public perception about sport[s] excellence is endangered; younger athletes aspiring to high achievement in sport come to believe (and sometimes are lead
to believe) that they too must use such drugs if they are to succeed; and a great
many athletes come to regard their fellow competitors not as colleagues engaged in
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NCAA's drug-testing program are to protect the health of the athlete and the integrity of intercollegiate competition.16 1 In order to
achieve these ends, the NCAA is committed to both drug-testing

65

fair competition, but rather as objects of suspicion about whom allegations and
counter-allegations of drug use are made.
Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 6, at 3. The effects of drug use in sports does not only hurt
the public perception of only the athlete, but extends to the overall perception of athletics:
When a major sports figure is found to be drug dependent, even though he may be
an involuntary role model, he disappoints and hurts many more people than just
himself. It can be devastating not only for the athlete, who throws away the precious
gifts of supreme athletic ability and achievement, but also for the young person who
idolizes and often emulates him.
Sports and Drug Abuse: Senate Hearing 98-1220 Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and
Drug Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1984) (opening statement of Senator Hawkins). The existence of "[h]uge salaries, illegalities
on college campuses and the seemingly endless reports of drug and alcohol abuse have moved
fans to the point where they wait, and in some cases root, for the athletes to fail." Cassidy,
Heading Off Substance Abuse at the Pass, Newsday, Feb. 28, 1989, at col. 1. Ben Johnson's
positive test results, see infra note 215, are illustrative of the effect that even one athlete can
have upon a sport. Canadian track officials have experienced many problems obtaining sponsors for events within Canada and several track meets have been cancelled. Jeansonne, Johnson and His Sport Hurt by Divorce, Newsday, Jan. 30, 1989, at 95, col. 1, col. 3. Mazda
Corp., which sponsored a track team consisting of the best Canadian athletes, including Ben
Johnson, has decided that it will no longer sponsor the team. Id. at 95, col. 3.
164. The preface to the 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program exemplifies the NCAA's
interest in conducting random drug-testing. The preface provides the following:
With their approval of Proposal No. 30 at the January 1986 Convention and Proposal No. 80 at the January 1988 Convention, NCAA member institutions reaffirmed
their dedication to the ideal of fair and equitable competition at their championships
and postseason certified events. At the same time, they took another step in the
protection of the health and safety of the student-athletes therein competing. So
that no one participant might have an artificially induced advantage, so that no one
participant might be pressured to use chemical substances in order to remain competitive and to safeguard the health and safety of participants, this NCAA drugtesting program has been created.
NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 2. Article 2 of the NCAA's constitution sets forth the
purposes and fundamental policy of the NCAA. Quoted in relevant part, the purposes of the
NCAA are:
(a) To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for studentathletes and to promote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness, sports
participation as a recreational pursuit and athletic excellence ...
(c) To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory
standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism...
(i) To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate athletics and establish standards whereby colleges and universities of the United States can maintain
their athletics activities on a high level.
NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 2 § I (a), (c), (i).
165. See supra note 164 (discussing the NCAA's motivations for conducting drug-testing). In addition to conducting its own drug-testing program, the NCAA encourages its member institutions to establish their own testing programs. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8,
at 19-20. Towards that end, the NCAA has provided guidelines which inform member institu-
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and drug education. 6 The banned substance list is indicative of
these concerns. Each substance on the NCAA banned substance list
enables athletes to create a competitive advantage, whether perceived or actual. 67 Despite the uncertainty of whether banned sub-

stances enable an athlete to obtain a tangible advantage, there is
incontrovertible evidence that the use of banned substances by student-athletes creates serious health-related dangers to themselves
and others.' 68 In addition, the NCAA drug-testing program selects
tions of the necessary prerequisites to a legally permissible program. Id. For a discussion of the
similarities and differences between the NCAA drug-testing program and a university's drugtesting program, see Scanlan, supra note 47, at 882-92, and Brock & McKenna, Drug Testing
in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REV. 505, 533-42 (1988).
166. NCAA publications clearly illustrate the NCAA's concern with the athlete's health
and the community's perception of college athletics. The NCAA firmly believes that education, along with drug-testing, is an effective means of prevention. Towards that end, the
NCAA encourages its member institutions to engage in extensive drug rehabilitation and drug
education:
The NCAA commitment is to the overall development of the student-athlete. A
major portion of that responsibility entails providing authoritative, comprehensive
information to coaches, athletics administrators and student-athletes about the dangers and realities of drug abuse.
NCAA, DRUGS AND THE ATHLETE ... A LOSING COMBINATION 1 (1988) [hereinafter DRUGS
AND THE ATHLETE].
167. See NCAA EXEC. REG., supra note 5, art. I, § 7(b), (c) (reprinting the banned
drug classes for 1988-89 with common examples); Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, $%13-20, at
7-11 (providing an exhaustive description of the dangerous effects associated with the banned
substances on the NCAA list); DRUGS AND THE ATHLETE, supra note 166, at 2-6 (listing
NCAA banned substances and their impact on athletic performance). The NCAA provides
the following comments concerning the banned substance list: "[t]his list is comprised of substances generally purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to the
health and safety of the student-athlete. The drug classes specifically include stimulants (such
as amphetamines and cocaine) and anabolic steroids as well as other drugs." NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 2. In addition, the NCAA has instituted anabolic steroid testing in the
off-season for the sport of football and other sports on a voluntary basis. NCAA BYLAWS,
supra note 24, art. 5, § 2(d); see NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 18-19 (reprinting the
guidelines for NCAA off-season steroid testing in football). Twenty-five institutions, involving
546 student-athletes, have agreed to participate in the NCAA's off-season steroid testing program. NCAA, 1987-88 ANNUAL REPORTS 38 (1989) (reprinting report of Executive Committee) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS].
168. See Chaikin, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at
82. Tommy Chaikin, a long-term steroid user and varsity football player at the University of
South Carolina, describes how continual steroid use almost led him to suicide:
I was sitting in my room at the roost, the athletic dorm at the University of South
Carolina, with the barrel of a loaded .357 Magnum pressed under my chin. A .357
is a man's gun, and I knew what it would do to me. My finger twitched on the
trigger.
I was in bad shape, very bad shape. From the steroids. It had all come down
from the steroids, the crap I'd taken to get big and strong and aggressive so I could
play this game that I love.
Id. at 84. The experience of Tommy Chaikin is not an isolated event. In a Harvard Medical
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student-athletes based on position of finish or suspicion. 169 If random
selection is not permitted, the NCAA's purposes for conducting
drug-testing will be significantly impaired.170 The NCAA drug-testing program is also administrative in nature.17 ' Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, the NCAA established a program which does not
7 2
If
subject the student-athlete to any form of criminal prosecution.
School study of approximately 41 steroid users, five of the study subjects (12.2%) showed
signs of psychoses. These included paranoid and grandiose delusions, auditory hallucinations,
and paranoid jealousy. Five of the study subjects (12.2%) had manic episodes and symptoms,
and five other subjects (12.2%) developed major depression. Pope & Katz, Affective and
Psychotic Symptoms Associated with Anabolic Steroid Use, 145 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 487, 48889 (1988); see also Monmaney & Robins, The Insanity of Steroid Abuse, NEWSWEEK, May
23, 1988, at 75; Altman, Concern Grows Over Steroids, N.Y. Times,, Sept. 28, 1988, at D32,
col. I. Drugs such as cocaine, amphetamines and steroids cause increased aggressiveness,
lessen awareness to pain, and are dangerous to both the user and players. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 842 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1988); Altman, New 'Breakfast of Champions. A Recipe for Victory or Disaster?, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 3. Steroid use has been linked to increased cholesterol level
and blood pressure which may lead to an increased risk of heart disease. See Bishop, Study of
Athletes Shows Steroid Pills Harm Cholesterol, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1989, at B4, col. 4;
Altman, supra, at A22, col. 4.
169. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
170. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 2; Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136,
1142 (3d Cir.) (concluding frequent and random alcohol and drug-testing is an effective means
of demonstrating the sport's integrity), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 577 (1986), But see Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 63 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986) (concluding the state's interest will
not be significantly impaired by individualized suspicion). Dr. Robert Dugal, see supra note
163, states the following concerning the NCAA's necessity of selecting student-athletes based
upon random selection:
The NCAA does not recommend testing only on probable cause or individual suspicion. This is reasonable as it is practically impossible to detect by observation alone
the use of anabolic steroids, depressants and even stimulants in most cases. Additionally, mere testing would stigmatize student-athletes .... [T]esting all competitors would be logistically impossible and financially prohibitive. Thus, a selection
process based upon randomization is the fairest way to conduct the choice of athletes for testing and is consistent with the deterrent effect which is sought.
Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 1 22, at 12-13.
171. Cf National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179 (5th Cir.
1987) (reasoning that the need for protections against a particular intrusion is lessened where
the search is conducted pursuant to an administrative scheme), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989);
see supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text (discussing the administrative search doctrine,
and suggesting that warrantless and random searches will be permitted so long as the policies
underlying the fourth amendment are shielded).
172. This distinction has influenced several courts to hold particular drug-testing programs constitutionally reasonable. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (finding no evidence that urinalysis tests were conducted for criminal investigatory purposes); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 858 (N.D.
Ind.) (concluding that the drug-testing program was non-punitive in nature and students would
be denied participation only in extracurricular sports), aff'd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
But see, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (stating that
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a student athlete tests positive, the student-athlete remains eligible
for participation in all intercollegiate competitions except for NCAA
championships and certified postseason football contests.1 7 3 Participation in intercollegiate athletics is voluntary to the extent that com-

petition in athletics, and more specifically postseason competition, is
merely a privilege and not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. 4
Thus, the student-athlete is put on notice that the privilege of inter-

collegiate participation may be withdrawn if certain violations
5
1
occur. 7

The rules and regulations continually promulgated by the
NCAA pursuant to its rule-making authority 176 are illustrative of
the NCAA's concern with the health of the athlete and integrity of
athletics. In almost every instance, the NCAA has enacted regulaindividuals are protected by the fourth amendment all of the time, not only when criminal
suspicion exists), affd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding drug-testing program unconstitutional where
defendants were legally compelled to criminally charge those who tested positive).
In O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F. 2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), the court determined the likelihood of success on the
merits of a constitutional claim challenging the NCAA drug-testing program. In finding the
program constitutional, the court reasoned:
In providing the urine sample, the student-athlete is not threatened with the consequences . . .of a criminal investigation. The only consequence facing a studentathlete who tests positive (after subsequent testing confirming positive results) is
denial of intercollegiate eligibility, which is not protected by either the State or
Federal constitution.
679 F. Supp. at 1005.
173. Refusal to sign the consent form, however, results in ineligibility for all intercollegiate competition. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra note 195 (reprinting and
discussing NCAA drug consent form).
174. It is unlikely a student-athlete will successfully allege that a student-athlete possesses a constitutional right to engage in intercollegiate post season competition. See Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602,
610-11 (C.D. Ill.
1987); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 222 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 854-55; Note, supra note 52, at 220-29; supra text accompanying
note 147. As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
"[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577.
175. See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
176. The NCAA constitution states the following as one of its fundamental purposes:
"To legislate, through bylaws or by resolution of a Convention, upon any subject of general
concern to the members in the administration of intercollegiate athletics ....
" NCAA CONST.,
supra note 2, art. 2, § 1(h). The subject matter of the NCAA legislation concerns the conduct
of athletic program in areas such as admissions, financial aid, eligibility and recruiting. Member institutions are obligated to apply and enforce NCAA legislation. NCAA CoNsr., supra
note 2, art. 2, § 2(b); see also infra notes 183-85 (discussing NCAA's requirements concerning
eligiblity, recruitment, membership, and academic standards).
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tions which enhance the integrity of intercollegiate athletics and ensure fairness in competition. The NCAA has enacted various regulations governing the ethical conduct of student-athletes as well as
staff members of member institutions. 17 The NCAA's code of ethics
governs activities such as gambling,1 7 8 compensation,17 9 and contracts. 180 In addition, the NCAA constitution provides principles of
ethical conduct governing staff members who have knowledge of a
student-athlete's use of a banned substance, or a staff member's failure to follow certain procedures concerning drug abuse."8 '
The NCAA's concern for the integrity of intercollegiate athletics goes beyond rules and regulations directed at the ethical conduct
of member institutions. Regulations prohibit the advertising of products or activities which are detrimental to the welfare of studentathletes and are not in the best interest of higher education.182 In
addition, extensive regulations have been enacted governing recruitminimum academic standards, 85 and eligiment, 18 3 membership,
177. See NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 3, § 1 (listing NCAA's principles of ethical
conduct); cf Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.) (finding a drug-testing
program constitutional where the Racing Commission was concerned with the health of the
jockeys and fairness in competition), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
178. Id. art. 3, § 6(c).
179. Id. art. 3, § 6(d), (g), (i). (i).
180. Id. art. 3, § 6(h).
181. Id. art. 3, § 6(b).
182. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 2, § 20); NCAA ExEc. REa., supra note 5,
art 1,§ 19(a). The general "[a]dvertising policies of the NCAA are designed to exclude those
advertisements that do not appear to be in the best interests of higher education .... [T]he
following expressly are prohibited: alcoholic beverages that exceed six percent alcohol by volume, cigarettes, smokeless tobacco and other tobacco products, professional sports organizations or personnel ... and organizations or individuals promoting gambling." Id. (parenthetical omitted). In addition, the NCAA expressly recommends that member institutions prohibit
the consumption of alcoholic beverages at the site of athletic competition. NCAA Recommended Policy, policy 13. NCAA executive director Dick Schultz has stated that after the
1990 NCAA basketball tournament, there will no longer be any beer advertising despite the
fact that beer advertising generated over $36 million in network revenues. Topol, Schultz
Brings Human Touch to Stuffy NCAA, Newsday, Jan. 5, 1989, at 106, col. 3.
183. NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 3, § 5; NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 1.
The NCAA promulgates recruiting rules "to prevent member institutions athletic departments
from influencing high school athletes, in the throws of making secondary education decisions,
to the exclusion of other educational considerations and values." Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F.
1987).
Supp. 602, 615 (C.D. Ill.
184. NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art 4; NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 9, §§ 1-4.
185. NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art. 3, § 3; NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 5, §
1(j) (including "Note" provisions). In January, 1989, the NCAA reinforced the bylaws, commonly known as "Proposition 48," by adopting Proposal 42. Under Propositon 48, studentathletes would still receive their scholarships if they met the minimum grade point average or
the minimum standardized test scores. Under Proposal 42, however, partial qualifiers will not
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bility.' 86 These rules prevent a member institution from engaging in
unfair competition to the detriment of other member institutions, the
athlete, and the overall perception of intercollegiate athletics.
3. Pervasive Regulation.-

In addition to illustrating the

NCAA's compelling interest in random testing, the NCAA's extensive regulations serve another equally important purpose. Combined
with the circumstances surrounding intercollegiate athletics, the

NCAA should be characterized as a pervasively regulated industry."8 7 The NCAA's regulations cover almost every aspect of inter-

collegiate athletics and are extremely comprehensive and detailed.188
Student-athletes who become participating members are put on notice that they will be subject to the intrusive authority of the
NCAA.1 89 In essence, student-athletes are voluntary participants in
receive any scholarship money. Rhoden, Scholarship Eligibility Tightened, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1989, at D24, col. 5. The NCAA's promulgation of Proposal 42 has caused an intense
debate over whether Proposition 42 and Proposal 48 are discriminatory and unfair to impoverished students because of the alleged biases inherent in standardized tests. John Thompson,
Georgetown University's basketball coach, protested Proposition 48 by refusing to coach two
games. See Alfano, How to Gain Credibility On Eligibility, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at B9,
col. 1; Rhoden, Georgetown Presses Its Case on Freshman, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at
A21, col. 1; Rhoden, Thompson's Protest Intensifies Debate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1989, at
C3, col. 4.
Subsequent to Thompson's protest, a poll by The Washington Post indicated that 49% of
the member institutions initially voting on Proposition 42 at the time it passed presently oppose
the proposal. Morin & Asher, Poll Shows Proposition42 Losing Support, Wash. Post, Feb.
16, 1989, at Cl, col. 1; see The Proposition42 Poll: What the NCAA RepresentativesSaid,
Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1989, at C14, col. 3; Opinion Shifting on Propostion 42, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 1989, at A32, col. 1.
186. NCAA CONST., supra note 2, art 3, § 9; NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, arts. 4, §
1, 5, §§ 1, 5-7.
187. See supra note 124 (discussing the pervasive regulation distinction).
188. Illustrative of the detail common throughout the NCAA regulations are the rules
governing contacts and visits of prospective recruits. With regard to contacts, the NCAA regulates the information permitted to be given to prospective student-athletes as follows:
(iii) One annual athletics recruiting brochure (with only one color of printing inside
the covers) per sport...
(v) One wallet-size playing schedule per sport...
(x) Newspaper clippings, which may not be assembled in any form of scrapbook...
NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 1, § l(b)(3)(iii), (v), (x). The NCAA has even promulgated regulations governing the types of air fare and amount of hours a recruit may remain on
a member institution's campus:
(a) A member institution may finance one and only one visit to its campus for a
given prospective student-athlete. Such visit shall not exceed 48 hours .... If commercial air transportation is used, the fare may not exceed tourist (or comparable)
class.
NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 24, art. 1, § 9(a).
189. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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a highly regulated area. 90 This is especially true since the NCAA's
constitution explicitly provides the NCAA with legislative and regulatory power concerning matters relevant to intercollegiate
athletics. 191
The student-athlete is additionally put on notice of the NCAA's
intrusive authority when the NCAA consent form is signed by the
student-athlete prior to participation in intercollegiate competition
each year.

92

Arranged in three parts, the consent form contains a

statement concerning eligibility, 93 the release of information,' and
drug-testing. 95 While a search may be constitutionally reasonable
190. Cf. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 n.5 (3d Cir.) (finding jockeys were
voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). But
cf. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding fire fighters
were not voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry).
191. See supra note 176.
192. The introduction to the consent form provides, in relevant part: "Before you sign
this form, you should read the Summary of NCAA Regulations provided by your director of
athletics or read the sections of the NCAA Manual that deal with your eligibility." NCAA
PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 5 (reprinting student-athlete consent form).
193. The statement concerning eligibility states, in relevant part:
By signing this part of the form, you affirm that, to the best of your knowledge, you
are eligible to compete in intercollegiate competition.
You affirm that you have read the Summary of NCAA Regulations or the relevant
sections of the NCAA Manual, and that your director of athletics gave you the
opportunity to ask questions about them.
You affirm that you meet the NCAA regulations for student-athletes regarding eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status and involvement in organized
gambling ....
You affirm that you understand that if you sign this statement falsely or erroneously, you violate NCAA legislation on ethical conduct and you will further jeopardize your eligibility.
NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 5-6.
194. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 6 (reprinting the Buckley Amendment Consent). Pursuant to the Buckley Amendment Consent, student-athletes give their consent only to
disclose the following information to authorized NCAA representatives: the Buckley Amendment Consent form, results of NCAA drug tests, academic transcripts, financial aid records,
and information obtained pertaining to NCAA eligibility. Id.
195. See NCAA CoNsT., supra note 2, art. 3, § 9(g). The student-athlete consent form,
subject to annual review by the NCAA, provides the following:
Drug-Testing Consent
By signing this part of the form, you certify that you agree to be tested for
drugs. You agree to allow the NCAA, during the academic year, before, during or
after you participate in any NCAA championship or in any postseason football
game certified by the NCAA, to test you for the banned drug listed in Executive
Regulation 1-7-(b) in the NCAA Manual.
You reviewed the procedures for NCAA drug-testing that are described in the
NCAA Drug-Testing Program brochure.
You understand that if you test positive (consistent with NCAA drug-testing protocol), you will be ineligible to participate in postseason competition for at least 90
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pursuant to voluntary consent,198 it is unlikely the NCAA consent
form will serve as a blanket waiver of the student-athlete's fourth
amendment rights. 197 However, in addition to the NCAA's extensive

regulations, the consent form is another factor lowering the studentathlete's expectation of privacy. Pursuant to the consent form, the
student-athlete has advance knowledge of the breadth and scope of
the NCAA's regulations.1 98 Student-athletes who choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics undoubtedly know the NCAA will

exercise its regulatory authority in order to ensure the fairness of
competition and integrity in intercollegiate athletics and higher
education. 99
days.
If you test positive and lose eligibility for 90 days, and then test positive again after
your eligibility is restored, you will lose postseason eligibility in all sports for the
current and the next academic year.
You understand that this consent and the results of your drug tests, if any, will only
be disclosed in accordance with the Buckley Amendment consent.
Date Signature of student-athlete
Date Signature of parent if the student-athlete is a minor
NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 6-7; see also supra note 194 (discussing the Buckley
Amendment Consent).
196. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
197. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 857 (N.D. Ind.),
affd 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Lock & Jennings, supra note 22, at 606-08; Note, supra
note 110, at 822-30. While a consent form provides the student-athlete with "notice of the
program, . . . it will not operate as a waiver of constitutional rights at the operational level."
Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 857.
198. The traditional application of the administrative search exception involved unannounced searches of property. See cases cited supra note 117. However, where notice exists,
the constitutional reasonableness of an administrative search is enhanced. See, e.g., Shoemaker
v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.) (noting that unlike traditional warrantless searches,
the contested searches were announced), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Schaill, 679 F.
Supp. at 857 (finding urinalysis testing reasonable where consent forms provided advanced
notice of drug-testing program); Mullholland v. Department of Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565,
1569 (E.D. Va. 1987) (finding employees had advance knowledge of urinalysis testing). But cf.
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1519 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding urinalysis testing
unreasonable where plaintiffs had no warning or notice whatsoever). An individual can consent
only to reasonable searches, and advance consent to future unreasonable searches is not constitutional. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985), afl'd as modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
199. In Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986), the Third Circuit made a similar observation: "When jockeys chose to become involved in this pervasively-regulated business... they did so with the knowledge that the Commission would exercise its authority to assure public confidence in the integrity of the industry." Id. at 1142; see also supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's
regulatory purpose).
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Factors and circumstances unique to athletics, although not determinative, also emphasize the student-athlete's lowered expectation
of privacy. The popularity and size of intercollegiate competition

places the athlete in a position of public

prominence.20 '

00

Conse-

quently, athletes are considered to be public figures for purposes of

libel and slander actions. 202 The media regularly publishes articles
and reports concerning college athletics, and the NCAA annually
generates significant proceeds from national television contracts.20 3
200. During the 1987-88 year, the NCAA reported that "[riecord gross receipts again
were recorded, paid attendance increased and individual participation increased." ANNUAL
REPORTS, supra note 8, at 23. Men's championships and meets involved 12,482 student-athletes, and 1,584 teams, "[g]ross receipts were a record $76,700,636 and paid attendance was
1,608,227." Id. In women's championships and events, "[t]here were 7,344 women studentathletes and 1,073 teams participating in the 33 championships for women. Record gross receipts of $2,599,824 and paid attendance of 312,892 were recorded." Id. Yearly attendance at
college football games increased from 20,403,000 in 1960 to 35,541,000 in 1980. BUREAU OF
CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 235 (102d ed. 1981).
Similarly, yearly attendance of college basketball games increased from 29,041,000 in 1977 to
30,692,000 in 1980. Id.
Television coverage of NCAA championships and events has enhanced the popularity of
college athletics. It is estimated that the Division I Men's Basketball Championships were
viewed in 16.7 million homes. ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 8, at 127 (reprinting report of
NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Committee); see also infra note 203 (discussing the
amount of funds generated from NCAA television contracts). In conjunction with CBS Sports
and ESPN, NCAA Productions "coordinated coverage of 30 first-round games televised by
166 Stations." ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 8, at 127. At the 1988 College World Series, all
games were televised by ESPN and the "[slingle-game National Championship ... was televised live by CBS Sports." Id. at 123 (reprinting report of NCAA Baseball Committee).
201. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
202. Since 1967, in defamation actions brought by professional athletes and sports
figures, courts have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was a public figure or that the
subject of the publication was a matter of legitimate public interest thereby requiring the
plaintiff to prove the higher standard of malice. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (football coach); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine and Broadcasting, Inc., 392
F.2d 417 (9th Cir.) (baseball player Orlando Cepeda), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968);
Time Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (basketball player Neil Johnston); Chuy
v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (football player Don
Chuy); Bell v. Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984) (football player Theo Bell);
Fazekas v. Crain Consumer Group Div. of Crain Comms., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ind.
1984) (auto racer Dale Fazekas); Gomez v. Murdoch, 193 N.J. Super. 595, 475 A.2d 622
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (jockey Michael Gomez). The general reasoning is that an
athlete, professional or otherwise, becomes a public figure when that athlete "chooses to perform publicly in a sport which commands widespread interest, and regarding which the communications media regularly report." Id. at 600, 475 A.2d at 625.
203. See infra notes 213-17 (listing many published stories concerning athletic drug use
in professional, amateur, collegiate and high school athletics). In 1975, the NCAA generated
$13 million annually from the negotiation of television contracts. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510
F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975). More recently, the NCAA has negotiated a contract with
CBS for the rights to the NCAA Basketball Tournament. The NCAA convinced CBS to
spend $166 million over three years. Topol, Schultz Brings Human Touch To Stuffy NCAA,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:641

Athletes expect the presence of the media and other individuals in
areas considered to be as private as locker rooms or showers. 4 The
nature of athletic participation also lowers the athlete's expectation

of privacy. Physical contact is more likely to occur in athletic competition.10 5 Similarly, the student athlete is more accustomed to communal undress as well as periodic physical examinations.20
B.

The Reasonableness Requirement

Application of the administrative search exception will permit

the NCAA to conduct warrantless and random searches. However,
even if a search is constitutionally permissible without a warrant or
particularized suspicion, the fourth amendment still requires the
search to be reasonable. As a result, the NCAA will be required to
conduct its drug-testing program in a constitutionally reasonable
manner. 20 7 The test of reasonableness cannot be precisely defined or
mechanically applied. 08 "[I]t requires a balancing of the need for
the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails. 2 0 9 In order to balance these interests, the Supreme

Court has applied a twofold inquiry to determine if a search without
a warrant or probable cause is reasonable: first, was the search justified at its inception; second, "one must determine whether the search
Newsday, Jan. 5, 1989, at 106, col. 2.
204. See, e.g., Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
defendant's exclusion of female sports reporters violated both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Due Process Clause).
205. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 856 (N.D.
Ind.), aff'd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). While the court in Schaill did not view physical
contact as determinative of negating privacy expectations, it does illustrate the student-athlete's lowered expectation of freedom from physical intrusion. Id. Thus, student-athletes may
view urinalysis testing to be less intrusive than would the general student body. In addition,
urinalysis is not as intrusive as an invasion of bodily integrity or of an individual's home.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted), afl'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
206. See O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (W.D. Wash.),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988). Communal undress and periodic physical examinations are present in athletics unlike other university contexts. Id. In O°Halloran,
the court further observed that "in the context of health examinations, viewing and touching is
tolerated among relative strangers that would be firmly rejected, to say the least, in other
contexts." Id.
207. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502-03 (1987) (holding that a warrantless search not based on reasonable suspicion must still meet an overall standard of reasonableness); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1966) (holding that a warrantless
search must still meet the requirement of reasonableness).
208. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
209. Id.
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as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "210
1. Justified At Its Inception.- A search will be justified at its
inception where there is "a determination that there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up the evidence

sought." 211 In the context of intercollegiate drug-testing, a search
will be considered to be justified at its inception where there are reasonable grounds the search will reveal student-athlete drug use. 12
The NCAA's suspicion "is not directed at a particular individual but at an activity that has experienced a drug-abuse problem. ' 21 3
There is more than a slight reason for the NCAA to believe that the
high incidence of drug use which exists among professional 214 and
210. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1,20 (1968)).
211. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); cf.
O'Connor v. Ortega 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1503 (1987) (holding a search is justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the search will reveal work-related misconduct);
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (holding a search will be justified at its inception where reasonable
grounds exist that the search will result in evidence of student violations).
212. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997. 1004 (W.D. Wash), rev'd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988). The court in O'Halloran, confronted with a
constitutional challenge to the NCAA drug-testing program, expressed the inquiry in the following language: "First, was the action justified at its inception, that is, are there reasonable
grounds for believing that urine tests of student-athletes will turn up evidence of misconductinapproirpate [sic] drug use?" Id.; cf. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818
F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding a search is justified at its inception where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting the search will turn up evidence of work-related drug use). But
see Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516-20 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding search not
justified where there was no indication of any drug problem among fire fighters).
213. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004. The most publicized athlete who tested positive
was Oklahoma's Brian Bosworth. See Neff, Bosworth Faces the Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Jan. 5, 1987, at 21; Axthelm, A Star Flunks His Test, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1987, at 48. The
drug deaths of Boston Celtic first round draft choice Len Bias and All-American football
player and NFL Rookie of the Year Don Rogers, have publicized the seriousness and dangers
of drug use among college athletes. See McCallum, The Cruelest Thing Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 30, 1986, at 20; Keteyian & Selcraig, A Killer Drug Strikes Again, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 7, 1986, at 18. In light of the Vanderbilt University incident, see infra note
220, "[r]ecent events indicate that steroid use on campuses is prevalent indeed, in spite of
denials by many college coaches in football and other sports." Johnson, Steroids:A Problem
of Huge Dimensions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 1985, at 42. Before Charles Radler's
arrest in 1984, law enforcement officials considered Radler to have the largest and wealthiest
steroid operation in the country. Id. at 56. Radler's operation covered 38 states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 61. His start, however, began with college athletic programs: "I
started getting calls from college football teams. That surprised me at first. Now it would
surprise me if there was a college football team out there that isn't using steroids." Id. (quoting Charles Radler).
214. There exists a continuous flow of media stories concerning professional athletes'
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amateur athletes 215 also occurs on an intercollegiate level."1 ' The use
drug related problems, arrests, and even death. See, e.g., Rozelle: Mack Out 30 Days, Newsday, Sept. 1, 1989, at 160, col. 3 (Cleveland Browns Fullback Kevin Mack); Probert of Red
Wings Arrested on Drug Charge, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1989, at A29, col. 2 (NHL forward
Bob Probert); Moran, The Final Chance For Antley, Newsday, Jan. 27, 1989, at 146, col. 3
(jockey Chris Antley); McTear Pleads Guilty To Selling Cocaine, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989,
at A18, col. 1 (sprinter and former world record holder in the 100-yard dash, Houston
McTear); Muncie Indicted on Drug Charges, Newsday, Oct. 27, 1988 at 153, col. 3 (former
NFL running back Chuck Muncie). Guilty Plea by McLain, Newsday, Oct. 19, 1988, at 115
(former Detroit Tigers pitcher Denny McLain); Crime Lab: Cocaine Killed Croudip, Newsday, Oct. 13, 1988, at 149, col. 3 (NFL defensive back David Croudip); Ex-Champ Faces
New Drug Charges, Newsday, Sept. 15, 1988, at 155 (former WBA bantamweight champion
Bernardo Pinango).
In 1985, both Pete Rozelle, National Football League Commissioner, and Gene Upshaw,
executive director of the National Football League Players Association, denied the existence of
any black market for steroids or any widespread problem. Johnson, supra note 213, at 41-42,
44. The National Football League's position, however, was entirely reversed in 1988. Rozelle
warned that players found using steroids and other banned substances in 1989 will be banned
from the league for one year. King, Rozelle Targets Steroids, Newsday, Oct. 26, 1988, at 133,
col. 3. Estimates of steroid use in the National Football League (NFL) vary from 40% to
90% of all professional football players. Steve Courson, offensive guard of the Tampa Bay
Buccaneers and admitted steroid user, believes 75 % of the linemen in the NFL are on steroids
and 95% have tried them. Johnson, supra note 213, at 50; see also Willis, Parcells Claims
Giants Are Not Using Steroids, Newsday, Oct. 27, 1988, at 167.
In Superbowl XXIII, held on January 22, 1989, five players on the superbowl rosters were
suspended for drug use. Anderson, Suspended 5 'Down Here on Business', N.Y. Times, Jan.
19, 1989, at D27, col. 1; see Eskenazi, Wilson Suspended by N.F.L., N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1989, at Cl, col. .; Anderson, David, Goliath, and Stanley Wilson, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1989, at CS, col. 1. Drug use in the N.F.L. has become so problematic that the Buffalo Bills
allegedly hired private investigators to follow players suspected of drug use. King, Drugs Grab
the Headlines,Newsday, Jan. 16, 1989, at 92 col. 1; Newspaper, Police, Say Bills Had Player
Trailed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at D23, col. 1.
215. The 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul emphasized the drug problem among
amateur athletes. "At least half of the 9,000 athletes who competed at the Olympics in Seoul
used anabolic steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs in training according to estimates
by medical and legal experts as well as traffickers in these drugs." Janofsky & Alfano, Drug
Use By Athletes Runs Free Despite Tests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at Al, col. I.
The most infamous positive test result was Canada's Ben Johnson who lost his gold medal,
a world record, and the ability to compete for two years after testing positive for drug use. See

Johnson & Moore, The Loser, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1988, at 20; More Evidence
Against Johnson, Newsday, Sept. 29, 1988, at 176, col. 1; Litsky, U.S. Stars Welcome the
Ban on Johnson, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at D32, col. 1; Janofsky, Johnson Loses Gold To
Lewis After Drug Test, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1988, at Al, col 4.
Charlie Francis, Ben Johnson's coach for 12 years, testified before a Canadian government inquiry that Johnson and 10 other Canadian athletes coached by Francis were involved
with steroids. Janofsky, Johnson's Coach Casts Doubt On Sprinter's World Record, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1989, at A29, col. 4; Coach: Ben Started Using Steroids in '81, Newsday,
Mar. 2, 1989, at 155, col. 1; see also DoctorAdmits Johnson Used Steroids, Wash. Post, Feb.
17, 1989, at F3, col. 4 (noting that Ben Johnson's personal physician, Jame Astaphan, admitted Johnson took steroids). Despite consistent denials, on June 13, 1989, Ben Johnson admitted
lying when he released an official statement which asserted that he had never knowingly taken
steroids or had them given to him by his trainer. Janofsky, Johnson Admits Lying About
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of drugs among athletes is so pervasive, it extends as far down as the
high school level.217 Pressures associated with athletics make the student-athlete more susceptible to drug use in order to enhance performance or alleviate the physical and mental pressures associated
with competition. 1 While it is widely known that street drugs are
Drugs and Asks for Reinstatement, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1989, at B 11, col. 3. Johnson admitted taking them from 1981 through the 1988 Summer Olympic Games at Seoul. Id.
The Bulgarian team pulled out of the Olympics in 1988 after two Bulgarian lifters were
stripped of their gold medals and Bulgarian officials reportedly feared the majority of Bulgarian lifters would test positive. Dropping Weights, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1988, at 18.
In addition, Jaques Demers, silver medalist in the 1984 Summer Olympics, admitted that two
top trainers of the Canadian weightlifting federation transferred their urine to four members
of the Canadian National Team, including himself, by using a catheter. Lifter: Used Urine
Transplants, Newsday, Feb. 3, 1989, at 143. The team members used the samples when they
discovered they would be tested before leaving the Seoul Olympics. However, three of the four
who were retested had positive results. Id. The problem is so extensive in weightlifting that
Richard Pound, International Olympic Committee Vice-President, stated he will recommend
to the Committee's executive board that weightlifting be removed from the Olympics. Dropping Weights, supra, at 18.
216. It should be noted that drug use among athletes is not gender specific. See Thomas,
Ashford Calls For An End To Women's Steroid Use, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at B15, col.
5; Lewis: Women Using More Drugs, Newsday, Feb. 2, 1989, at 129, col. 3. Olga Conolly, a
female Olympic discus thrower in the 1968 and 1972 Summer Olympic Games, noted that
steroid use among women at the 1972 Summer Olympics was so great that "'[o]f 12 discus
throwers in the weightroom, only three of ... [them] weren't on the drug .... A Frightening Lesson, Newsday, Feb. 5, 1989, at 23, col. 3.
217. See Stud), Teens Using Steroids, Newsday, Dec. 16, 1988, at 2, col. 2. A study
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association estimates that as many as
500,000 American high school seniors have used anabolic steroids. Id. A high school paper in
Florida reported that 18 % of the male students attending the school used steroids. Telander, A
Peril For Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 1988, at 114; see Schaill v. Tippecanoe
County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind.) (describing the seriousness of the drug
problem among high school student-athletes) aff'd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
Cassidy, Heading Off Substance Abuse at the Pass, Newsday, Feb. 28, 1989, at 118, col. I
(discussing the Athletes Helping Athletes program which uses both professional and high
school athletes as volunteers in an effort to combat drug use among high school athletes);
Wasserman, Drugs Cut From Team, Newsday, Nov. 2, 1988, at 23, col. 3 (describing a high
school's effort to battle drug use among student-athletes).
218. See Chaikin, supra note 168, at 85 (describing the pressures leading to steroid
use). The pressure to use performance enhancing drugs exists in all sports: "The strongest
people-the strongest athletes-in the world are all using steroids. They're being used not only
in the strength field, but also in track and field and in swimming. So you've got to get on drugs
if you want to survive." Johnson, supra note 213, at 50 (describing the experiences of Steve
Courson, offensive guard with the Tampa Bay Buccaneers football team). Drug use among
atheletes is so pervasive that "[j]ocks in almost every sport use the stuff-track and field,
swimming, boxing, wrestling, triathalon, cycling and, of course, power lifting and body building." Id. at 40. Olga Conolly, see supra note 216, noted that drug use was so prevalent that
"lilt
was really devastating to know that we were beaten even before we competed." A Frightening Lesson, Newsday, Feb. 5, 1989, at 23, col. 3. Sports Columnist George Vecsey notes that
"[p]eople around the world know that steroids=medals=money, unless you happen to get

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:641

easily obtained through clandestine markets, an enormous distribution network and black market permits athletes to easily purchase
performance-enhancing drugs."' 9 The supply of performance-enhancing drugs to athletes is so problematic that the Food and Drug Administration and the Justice Department have begun a joint investigation22n in an effort to stop the extensive drug distribution networks
directed solely at athletes. 2 1

The results of the NCAA's initial drug-testing in 1987, although limited, gives substantial credibility to the NCAA's grounds
caught ....A look at the expanded physiques in a National Football League locker room will
tell you what people will do for a year or two of glory and a professional athlete's salary."
Vecsey, Other Shoe Dropping on Johnson, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1989, at A29, col. 1. The
pressure to use drugs in athletics is so great that the use of performance enhancing drugs even
exists among golfers. In a study conducted by the U.C.L.A. Medical School, 18 of 93 golfers
used anti-anxiety drugs in order to control involuntary muscle movements. Fighting the Yips,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1989, at C2, col. 1.
219. Performance enhancing drugs are coming into the United States from Europe,
Mexico, and South America. Alfano & Janofsky, Drugs That May Build Bulk Pull Weight on
Black Market, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at Al, col. 1,A22, col. 3. It is also estimated that
5 to 20 underground laboratories are in operation in the United States. Id. A book entitled
"The Underground Steroid Handbook" has sold between 40,000 and 50,000 copies over a four
year period and informs readers, among other things, how to beat institutional drug tests.
Alfano & Janofsky, A Guru Who Spreads the Gospel of Steroids, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1988,
at AI, col. I, at 49, col. 2. A special report by Sports Illustrated describes the simplicity
involved when purchasing banned substances:
None of these drugs is supposed to be dispensed without a physician's prescription,
yet a veritable cornucopia of them is available on a massive black market so blatant
in its contempt for law enforcement that major dealers regularly send out directmail advertising and catalogs listing prices and shipping costs. In some instances
coaches dispense steroids to players.
Johnson, supra note 213, at 40. In a study authorized by the NCAA Drug Education Committee and conducted by the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine, 5% of
the athletes surveyed responded that they obtained steroids from their coach or trainer. MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE OF HUMAN MEDICINE, THE SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE OF HABITS OF

COLLEGE STUDENT-ATHLETES table 9 (1985) (on file at Hofstra Law Review). In addition,
31 % reported receiving major pain medications from the team physician, and 8% claimed
receiving barbiturates and tranquilizers from the coach or trainer. Id.
220. See Johnson, supra note 213, at 49. The federal investigation was initiated in 1985
after the scandal at Vanderbilt University. Id. at 42. Thirty-two Vanderbilt football players
from the past three seasons were listed as unindicted co-conspirators and two former Clemson
University coaches were indicted on charges of illegal sale and distribution of banned drugs.
Id. In addition, the drug-related death of a Clemson University runner has led to the discovery
of a distribution system which "may have illegally distributed as many as 100,000 units of
bute and various kinds of steroids, synthetic hormonal derivatives that athletes use in hope of
building bulk and strength." Brubaker, A Pipeline Full of Drugs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan.
21, 1985, at 18, 19.
221. See Alfano & Janofsky, Drugs That May Build Bulk Pull Weight on Black Market, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988 at Al, col. 1, A22, col. 1; Johnson, supra note 213, at 49;
Brubaker, supra note 220, at 20.
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for believing urine testing will turn up evidence of improper drug
use. NCAA officials tested student-athletes at ten postseason bowl
games. 222 No fewer than twenty-one athletes tested positive for ana-

bolic steroids and were thus suspended from competition for ninety
days.223 Although significant, the numbers are likely to have been
even higher since member institutions were not compelled to release
any information concerning test results and athletes were given ample notice of exactly when prebowl testing would take place.22 4 In

addition, the NCAA's advance announcement of its intention to
drug test is likely to have deterrent effect on student-athlete drug
use.2 25 Consequently, neither the deterrent value connected with

drug-testing athletes nor the NCAA's success should be used to
demonstrate a lack of a reasonable suspicion that testing will reveal
drug use.226 Lastly, the NCAA's compelling interest in the health of
the athlete and integrity of competition further support the notion

that the NCAA's drug-testing program was justified at its
inception.227
222. Neff, supra note 213 at 21, 22.
223. Id. at 21. In addition, the Executive Committee stated in its annual report for
1987-88 that "[d]uring the fall 1987 championships and certified postseason football games,
[and] the winter 1988 and spring 1988 championships, a total of 99 student-athletes (three
percent) tested positive ...." ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 167, at 38. In thirty-one of the
ninety-nine positive-test cases, there was a resultant loss of eligibility. Id.
224. Neff, supra note 213, at 21. The NCAA gave more than enough warning when it
began its initial drug-testing in January 1987. An announcement of the program was made one
year prior to the drug-testing, which gave athletes who have used drugs sufficient time to clean
their systems. Id. Moreover,the athletes were given a week's notice of the exact date of the
prebowl testing. Id. at 24.
225. In 1988, the second year of the NCAA's drug-testing program, the amount of positive results have decreased another 2-3 %. Uryasz Interview, supra note 26. The NCAA attributes this decrease to the deterrent value of the NCAA's testing results in 1987, and the increase in the amount of drug-testing programs conducted by member institutions themselves.
Id.
226. In O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd
on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), the court warned that the "evidence of the
[NCAA] program's success should not be used to demonstrate lack of need for the program or
that the program has no reasonable basis." Dr. Robert Dugal, see supra note 163, strongly
believes that drug-testing programs significantly decrease drug misuse in sports:
Frequency of detected use in controlled competitions can fall drastically. The occurrence of established usage of amphetamine-like compounds in the early sixties fell,
for example, from about 30 to a few percent (2-3%) in European competitions over
a few years after implementation of a testing program. More recently, when the
sport of [p]owerlifting began testing in Canada about 3 years ago, the rate of positives was about 30-35% and with continued testing and suitable penalties imposed
on athletes found positive, has decreased to about 3 %.
Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, q 12, at 6.
227. See supra notes 163-86 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's compelling

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:641

2. Reasonably Related To Original Justification.- In determining whether the search was reasonably related to the justification initiating the intrusion, "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification
for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." 2 ' The existence of procedural protections and standards is crucial to a judicial
determination of reasonableness. 2 9 Random searches which have not
provided any definitive standards and procedural guidelines limiting
the scope of the search have been found to be excessively intrusive
and therefore unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 3 Conversely, random drug-testing programs which have been found constitutional have provided individuals with sufficient notice, confidentiality, and definitive standards regarding selection and testing
methods. 31
The NCAA's procedural safeguards and selection methods are
carefully designed to be no more intrusive than necessary in order to
deal with the drug problem among athletes. It is limited in both
scope and manner. Although based upon random selection, the
NCAA program is not an arbitrary or unannounced search since the
tests will only be conducted at pre-determined times and places. 32
interest in conducting random drug-testing).
228. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
229. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520 (D.N.J. 1986). The most
critical distinction influencing the court's decision in Capua not to apply the Shoemaker administrative search exception was the procedural protections provided in the drug-testing program in Shoemaker and the complete lack of any procedural safeguards in the drug-testing
program challenged in Capua. Id.
230. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986
(1986); see, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 601 (1981) (finding a search unreasonable
where lack of standards existed to guide inspectors); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
323 (1978) (finding search unreasonable where executive and administrative officers were
given unbridled discretion concerning when and whom to search); see also infra note 234.
231. Compare Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143 (holding random drug-testing reasonable
where State Steward has no discretion in conducting test) and Mullholland v. Department of
Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding random drug-testing reasonable
where tests did not leave any discretion to supervisor) and Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 857 (N.D. Ind.) (holding random drug-testing reasonable
where program provided for a system for protecting confidentiality), affd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1988) with Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1520 (holding random search unreasonable where
program did not contain any procedural safeguards whatsoever) and Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 881 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (holding random drug-testing unreasonable
where no standards for frequency, purpose, or methods of conducting test established), afJ'd,
846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) and McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 n.4 (S.D.
Iowa 1985) (finding random drug-testing unreasonable where program lacked any standards
for implementation), afl'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
232. See supra notes 27-28, 222 and accompanying text.
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Student-athletes are tested only at postseason athletic events,233 and
the student-athlete consent forms and NCAA publications provide
student-athletes advance notice of the method, time, and place drug-

testing will occur.234 Rather than testing all postseason participants,
random drug-testing at postseason events avoids the implication of
guilt or the inference that all student-athletes use banned

substances.235
Moreover, the manner of testing is not within the unfettered
discretion of the official in the field. Only the NCAA committee responsible for drug testing is empowered to decide the method of testing athletes. 3 6 Detailed procedures which ensure confidentiality and
accuracy are set forth in writing concerning chain of custody, notification, and specimen collection. 3 7 The reliability of testing methods
is enhanced by the use of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. 38
These procedures are recognized by both the courts23 9 and medical
experts 240 to be virtually 100 % accurate. Specific false positive stan233. See supra notes 5, 24-25 and accompanying text.
234. NCAA EXEC. REG., supra note 5, art 1, § 7(a); see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's initial drug-testing in 1987).
235. Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 23, at 13. In Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986), the challenged drug-testing program involved the mass testing and
"roundup" of all fire fighters. Id. at 1517. The court found this method of selection to be
unconstitutional since it shifted the burden of proving innocence to the fire fighters rather than
requiring the defendants to prove the fire fighters' misconduct. Id. Consequently, the court
noted that "[s]uch an unfounded presumption of guilt is contrary to the protections against
arbitrary and intrusive government interference set forth in the Constitution." Id.
236. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 11 (reprinting §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1 "Organization"); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (finding search constitutional where the authority to conduct searches was given to high ranking officials rather
than field officers); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir.) (finding search reasonable where State Steward had no discretion and targets were selected by Racing Commission), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
237. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA drug-testing
program's procedural safeguards); cf. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516
(D.N.J. 1986) (finding search unconstitutional where no procedural guidelines regarding collection, testing, and utilization of information existed); Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F.
Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding search unconstitutional where none of the methods
for testing, standards for analyzing, or procedures for implementation were put in writing),
aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988).
238. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416, 427-28
(D.D.C. 1988) (explaining the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry process); Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, supra note 32 (providing an exhaustive and technical explanation of all
testing methods); see also supra note 22 (discussing the accuracy of NCAA certified
laboratories).
239. See, e.g., Lovvorn 647 F. Supp. at 878 & n.4; Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 428.
240. See, e.g., Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 1 26, at 14. Dr. Robert Dugal, see supra
note 163, states that the testing procedures are 100% accurate and cannot cause a false posi-
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dards have also been established in order to eliminate false positive
errors, 241 and all positive results are required to be reconfirmed by
another laboratory technician.2 42 Student-athletes are notified of any
positive results and detailed notification procedures are provided
which assure student-athletes that the information revealed by the
urine test will be kept confidential. 4 3 If a student-athlete tests positive, an extremely limited group of NCAA officials will receive the
student-athlete's name. 2 " Only after the results have been reconfirmed and all appeals have been exhausted, will the NCAA notify
the member institution's chief executive officer and director of athletics concerning the findings and results of any appeal. 45 Member
institutions are not compelled to publicly release test results and the
NCAA recommends that member institutions answer all inquiries by
only stating that the student-athlete was found to be in violation of
tive result. Moreover, information generated by the NCAA testing procedures "are as specific
to a drug (or metabolite) as are the fingerprints of any individual." Dugal Affidavit, supra note
32, %26, at 14.
241. Testing results accurately determine the presence of banned substances since
"urinalysis results are either positive or negative, leaving no room for official discretion in
interpreting the tests." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177
(5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, the NCAA has
assured testing accuracy by making quantitative distinctions for certain substances which may
cause a positive result even though the substance entered the individual's system for medical
purposes or by passive inhalation (e.g. marijuana). NCAA EXEc. REG., supra note 5, art. 1, §
7(c); see Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 1 19, at 10. In addition, quantitative distinctions are
made for caffeine and nicotine. NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 9-10; see Dugal Affidavit,
supra note 32, 1 20-21, at 11-12.
Because certain medications may cause positive results, NCAA regulations provide a listing of certain classes of substances which are given special consideration and student-athletes
are instructed to inform testing officials if they are using medication. See NCAA EXEC. REG.,
supra note 5, art. 1, § 7(c); Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 1 28, at 15. For a description of
how similar detailed procedures function in a real setting, see Johnson & Moore, The Loser,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 3, 1988, at 20 (chronicling the International Olympic Committee's
testing and retesting of Ben Johnson's urine specimen).
242. See supra note 32 (discussing the influence of human factors upon the reliability of
drug testing procedures).
243. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's notification
procedures); cf Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986) (finding search reasonable where results were kept confidential even from enforcement agencies); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding
search constitutionally unreasonable where results were publicized thereby subjecting fire
fighters to public suspicion and degradation).
244. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 15-17 (reprinting §§ 6.0-7.5 "Chain of
Custody" and "Notification of Results").
245. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 17 (reprinting § 7.3 discussing NCAA
notification of a member institution).
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NCAA eligibility rules. 2"
The existence of alternative procedures has also influenced some
courts' finding that a drug-testing program is more intrusive than
necessary and therefore not reasonably related to the original justification for the intrusion.247 Urine testing, however, is the most effective method which does not considerably frustrate the NCAA's purposes for initiating drug-testing. 48 Observation is not a wholly
accurate indicator of drug use. 249 It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect a student-athlete's use of a particular banned substance without urine testing since many of the commonly used sub250
stances by athletes do not produce recognizable symptoms.
The only intrusive aspect of the NCAA program is the fact that
student-athletes may be required to submit a specimen in front of an
NCAA official in order to verify the specimen's accuracy.251 How246. See supra note 34.
247. See, e.g., Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn.
1986) (concluding drug use should be detectable by procedures detecting symptoms such as
absenteeism, aberrant conduct, and financial difficulties rather than urine testing), af'd, 846
F. 2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416,
430 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding urine testing intrusive where observation by trained supervisors
and neurobehavioral testing was not attempted). But see, e.g., National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 180 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding the availability of alternative
sources of information did not eliminate the need for urine testing)., afd, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
248. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 163-66, 176-86
and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's regulatory purposes).
249. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 680 F. Supp. at 430 (noting that observation can only detect chronic drug use and some on-duty drug use). New testing methods are
constantly being developed. For example, nuclear chemist Werner A. Baumgartner has developed a drug-testing method which detects drug use by analysis of human hair. Cox, Analysis
of Hair Traces Drug Use, Nat'l. L.J., July 27, 1987, at 3, col. 1. Unlike the submission of
urine, hair removal is less intrusive and therefore less likely to be considered a search under
the fourth amendment. Id.; cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (finding that
compelled voice and handwriting samples are physical characteristics which are constantly exposed to the public). But cf. Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding
compelled removal of pubic hair to be a search).
Unlike gas chromatography/mass spectrometry detection procedures, see supra notes 22,
237-38 and accompanying text, hair analysis has been subject to a great deal of criticism.
Naresh Jain, chief toxicologist for Los Angeles County, declared that "'Mr. Baumgartner's
work is not worth the paper it is written on .... " Cox, supra, at 8, col. 3. Jain's opinion is
based upon the fact that "the test has not been substantiated either in scholarly journals or
through independent research." Id.
250. See Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 22, at 12-13 (discussing the difficulties in
detecting student-athlete drug use).
251. See NCAA PAMPHLET, supra note 8, at 14 (reprinting § 5.1.4 "Specimen-Collection" procedures); ef. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986)
(finding the submission of urine under close surveillance intrusive); Mullholland v. Department
of Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1568 (E.D. Va. 1987) (finding search less intrusive where an
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ever, new methods for specimen verification are continually being developed2 52 and since the NCAA has not hesitated to use the most
advanced and modern techniques to ensure accuracy and confidentiality,2 53 the NCAA is likely to eliminate the necessity of observing
the student-athlete.

The unique position of athletes as compared with employees
also supports the notion that drug-testing conducted without particularized suspicion is not excessively intrusive. Random testing of employees has been found to be more intrusive than necessary because
urine testing may provide information, including drug use, which
may not be relevant to whether the employee's job performance is
impaired. 54 Within intercollegiate athletics, however, the concern is
not only with the impairment of performance on the field. There is a
concern with performance in the classroom, fairness in competition,
and the integrity and continued viability of student athletics. 55 Employees' relationships with their employers are limited and confined
to established working hours and, in most instances, employees do
not represent their employers when they are off-duty. Unlike employees, student-athletes are likely to be subject to greater public
official listens rather than observes submission of specimen). But cf. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 n.5 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), afid, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988). In
Lovvorn, the court noted that although observation of an individual submitting urine contributed to the intrusiveness of the test, because there existed a lack of a less intrusive method, the
urine test was not unconstitutional. Id.
Dr. Dugal believes that observation is not only justified, but "has been current practice in
Dugal Affidavit, supra note 32, 25, at 13-14.
olympic sports for nearly twenty years ....
Observation was necessary "because there had previously been several deliberate attempts at
specimen substitution." Id; see, e.g., Lifter: Used Urine Transplants, Newsday, Feb. 3, 1989,
at 143 (describing urine substitution by the Canadian National weight lifting team in 1984,
using a catheter).
252. See, e.g., Andrews, Preventing Drug Test Cheating, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1988, at
34, col. 1. In order to prevent individuals from substituting samples, Dr. Joel Ehrenkranz has
developed a tamper-proof urine collection kit. Id. The invention prevents the removal of the
urine specimen from its container, gives a single temperature reading to additionally prevent
substitution, and even includes an enzyme to detect contaminants which may affect test results. Id. Although the NCAA is aware of several products which may enhance the integrity of
the specimen, the NCAA does not believe these products are sufficiently accurate. Uryasz
Interview, supra note 26.
253. See supra notes 5, 22, 238-41 and accompanying text.
254. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir.),
rev'd sub nom., Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Carlucci,
680 F. Supp. 416, 434-35 (D.C. 1988).
255. See supra notes 163-66, 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA's
regulatory purposes).
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recognition 256 and their relationships to member institutions go beyond the practice field.257
VI.

CONCLUSION

The NCAA's decision to drug-test student-athletes based upon
a random selection process raises important fourth amendment issues. Despite the general requirement of individualized suspicion, 5 8
the NCAA program is likely to survive a constitutional challenge
under the fourth amendment because the administrative search exception, which permits warrantless and random searches, should be
applied or analogized to the NCAA drug-testing program. 5 9 Courts
which have applied or analogized the administrative search exception
look to the purpose of the intrusion and the privacy expectations of
the individual.2 60 The NCAA has a compelling interest in the health
of the student-athlete, the integrity of both higher education and college sports, and fairness in competition.' Similar to participants in
a highly regulated industry, student-athletes who participate in intercollegiate competition have a diminished expectation of privacy because they are put on notice that they will be subject to rules and
regulations furthering the interests of intercollegiate athletics.2 62
The NCAA drug-testing program also fulfills the independent
constitutional requirement of reasonableness. The NCAA has a reasonable basis to believe random drug-testing will reveal student-athlete drug use, and the program contains procedural safeguards which
eliminate arbitrary discretion and intrusions. 6 3
Although the administrative search exception should be applied
to the NCAA drug-testing program, courts should not utilize the exception as a justification for all random drug-testing programs. However, where the purposes behind the fourth amendment are not sacrificed and the necessary safeguards and criteria exist, the
256.

See supra notes 163, 202-03 and accompanying text.

257. Compare Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 856 (N.D.
Ind. 1988) (finding random testing permissible since student-athlete has a unique relationship
with school beyond confines of school day), afid, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) with Jones v.

McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding urine tests which detect employee's
off-duty drug use unconstitutional).

258. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

161-206 and accompanying text.
117-60 and accompanying text.
161-86 and accompanying text.
187-206 and accompanying text.
207-57 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4

688

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:641

administrative search exception is a valuable weapon in the war
against drugs.
Craig H. Thaler
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